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Issue 1

The Impact of International Sanctions on Dispute Resolution in the Middle East

Sanctions Framework in the Middle East

Abstract

Over the past two decades, international sanctions have become a central tool of foreign policy, but their unintended impact on international arbitration continues to grow. Sanctions now routinely create procedural hurdles, limit party participation, and complicate the enforcement of arbitral awards under the 1958 New York Convention. As traditional arbitration centers like London, Paris, and New York face increasing restrictions tied to unilateral sanctions regimes, the Middle East has emerged as a neutral and arbitration-friendly alternative. This article examines how sanctions affect each stage of the arbitral process and highlights the United Arab Emirates’ (“UAE”) role as the most advanced arbitration jurisdiction in the Middle East. It focuses on institutions such as the Dubai International Arbitration Centre (“DIAC”) and the recently launched Abu Dhabi International Arbitration Centre, branded “arbitrateAD” (“arbitrateAD”), both of which have adopted modern frameworks aligned with international standards. While the UAE offers a viable path forward for sanctions-affected parties, the broader Middle East remains a region in transition, with other jurisdictions still developing the consistency and capacity of their global peers.

Introduction

International sanctions have become a dominant force in global politics, serving as a tool for governments to enforce compliance with international norms and achieve strategic objectives. Over the past two decades, the use of sanctions has increased significantly, offering governments an alternative means of exerting political pressure without the use of military action.

While their first function is to pressure targeted states, entities, and individuals—whether through economic measures like trade embargoes, asset freezes, and diplomatic actions—the broader implications of sanctions extend far beyond their intended targets. One of the most significant consequences is their impact on international dispute resolution, particularly arbitration, which has long been a preferred mechanism for resolving cross-border commercial disputes.

Sanctions create procedural and practical challenges for parties involved in international proceedings, requiring additional steps to exercise procedural rights. Procedural steps such as initiating arbitration, paying the required fees, and forming the arbitral tribunal can become complex for sanctioned parties. Similarly, securing external consultants, legal counsel, expert witnesses, and translators can become significantly more difficult.

Beyond procedural issues, parties must assess how sanctions affect the substantive rights and obligations under contracts, including the potential frustration of contractual performance. Sanctioned entities may face practical difficulties in seeking annulment of arbitral awards in courts, particularly where sanctions complicate the payment of court fees or access to counsel; sanctions do not, in themselves, bar annulment proceedings. The enforcement of awards can also be hindered, as national courts may refuse to recognize or enforce judgments involving sanctioned parties.

While this list is not exhaustive, it illustrates the significant obstacles faced by parties involved in sanctions-affected arbitrations and highlights the increasing importance of alternative arbitration venues. The Middle East, often viewed as a neutral player amid global tensions, has increasingly positioned itself as a vital hub for international arbitration, with the UAE at the forefront.

This article delves into how sanctions reshape dispute resolution in the region, contrasting its experiences with those of Western jurisdictions. Throughout this article, we will primarily focus on the UAE as the most developed arbitration jurisdiction in the Middle East.

Brief Overview of the Arbitration Landscape in the Middle East

A. General Overview

In recent years, the Middle East has evolved from a relatively minor presence into a recognized player in the international arbitration arena. While historically less developed than established venues such as London, Paris, or Stockholm, the region has steadily advanced its legislative and institutional frameworks to align with global standards and meet the expectations of sophisticated international users.

Most jurisdictions in the region are parties to the 1958 New York Convention, ensuring the cross-border enforceability of arbitral awards, and many have incorporated provisions from the UNCITRAL Model Law into their domestic legislation. These reforms have been accompanied by investment in arbitration infrastructure and institutional capacity. Notable examples include the UAE, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia, each of which has sought to position itself as a neutral, efficient, and commercially attractive venue for dispute resolution.1Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, arts. III–V, 330 U.N.T.S. 38, available at https://uncitral.un.org/sites/default/files/media-documents/uncitral/en/1958nyconvention.pdf; UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (1985), with amendments as adopted in 2006, available at https://uncitral.un.org/en/texts/arbitration/modellaw/commercial_arbitration; UNCITRAL, Status: UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, https://uncitral.un.org/en/texts/arbitration/modellaw/commercial_arbitration/status.1 The UAE stands at the forefront of this transformation. Federal Law No. 6 of 2018, as amended in 2023,2Federal Law No. 6 of 2018 Concerning Arbitration, as amended by Federal Decree-Law No. 15 of 2023 (UAE), available at https://uaelegislation.gov.ae/en/legislations/1069/download.2 provides a modern and comprehensive legislative framework for both domestic and international arbitration. The development of arbitration-friendly free zones - most notably the Dubai International Financial Centre3Arbitration Law, DIFC Law No. 1 of 2008, as amended by DIFC Law No. 1 of 2013, arts. 7, 42–44, available at https://assets.difc.com/v1/media/edge/images/dubaiintern0078-difcexperie96c5-production-3253/media/project/difcexperiences/difc/difcwebsite/documents/laws--regulations/arbitration_law_difc_law_no_1_of_2008.pdf.3 (“DIFC”) and Abu Dhabi Global Market4ADGM Arbitration Regulations 2015, §§ 3, 6, available at https://en.adgm.thomsonreuters.com/sites/default/files/net_file_store/Arbitration_Regulations_2015_English.pdf.4 (“ADGM”) - has further enhanced the UAE’s standing by offering English-language proceedings within a common law framework, coupled with independent, specialist courts.

B. The impact of these reforms is reflected in recent global rankings.

According to the GAR 100 Data Report 2025, Dubai ranks as the fifth most popular seat of arbitration worldwide based on caseload by seat from 2015 to 2022, behind only London, Singapore, Paris, and Hong Kong, and ahead of traditional hubs such as New York and Geneva.5David Samuels & Jack Ballantyne, GAR 100 Data Report: What Is the “Average” International Arbitration?, GLOBAL ARBITRATION REVIEW (2024), https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/gar-100-data-report-what-the-average-international-arbitration.5 This positions Dubai as the only seat in the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia to appear in the global top ten. Similarly, the 2025 International Arbitration Survey by Queen Mary University of London and White & Case  reveals that Dubai is the tenth most preferred seat globally,6QUEEN MARY UNIVERSITY OF LONDON & WHITE & CASE, 2025 INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION SURVEY: THE PATH FORWARD—REALITIES AND OPPORTUNITIES IN ARBITRATION 6–8 (2025), available at https://www.qmul.ac.uk/arbitration/media/arbitration/docs/White-Case-QMUL-2025-International-Arbitration-Survey-report.pdf.6 while for Middle East-based respondents, Dubai ranks fourth among their top five seats.7Id. at 7.7 Experienced parties, however, often distinguish between designating “Dubai” broadly - where judicial oversight falls to the UAE’s civil law courts - and specifying the DIFC or ADGM, where the common law framework offers internationally familiar procedures and a more predictable approach to enforcement. Beyond institutional and legislative development, the region has also invested in building its profile within the global arbitration community.

C. Leading Arbitration Institutions in the Region.

  1. DIAC

One of the most prominent arbitration institutions in the region is DIAC. Established in 1994 as the Conciliation and Arbitration Centre of the Dubai Chamber of Commerce and Industry, DIAC partnered with the London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA) between 2008 and 2021 through the DIFC-LCIA Arbitration Centre, before re-establishing itself independently in Dubai.

According to DIAC’s most recent annual report,8DUBAI INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION CENTRE, ANNUAL REPORT 2023, available at https://www.diac.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/DIAC-Annual-Report-2023.pdf.8 in 2023, DIAC registered 355 new cases, with an average dispute value of US$146.17 million, placing it 10th worldwide by caseload and 9th by total dispute value according to the GAR 100 Data Report 2025.9Samuels & Ballantyne, supra note 5.9 The 2022 DIAC Rules incorporate a range of modern features, including emergency arbitration, expedited proceedings, and provisions for joinder and consolidation.10DIAC Arbitration Rules (2022), arts. 8–9, 32, app. II, art. 2, available at https://www.diac.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/0.1-DIAC-Casework-2022-Arbitration-Rules.pdf.10 In January 2025, DIAC announced a strategic partnership with Opus 2 to launch a cutting-edge digital case management platform, offering secure e-filing, streamlined document submission, and centralized case registration. This initiative enhances transparency, cybersecurity, and efficiency for all participants in DIAC proceedings.11Opus 2, DIAC and Opus 2 Announce Partnership to Enhance Dispute Resolution Experience (Jan. 21, 2025), https://www.opus2.com/resources/news/diac-and-opus-2-partnership/.11

  1. ArbitrateAD

Launched in 2024, arbitrateAD is the successor to the Abu Dhabi Commercial Conciliation and Arbitration Centre (“ADCCAC”) and now serves as the primary arbitration institution in Abu Dhabi. Located within the ADGM, arbitrateAD benefits from the free zone’s common law framework and arbitration-supportive judiciary.

The institution’s rules and operations reflect global best practices, supported by a fully digital case management system. While arbitrateAD has yet to release its first annual report, the Secretariat has indicated in conference discussions and industry forums that it is already administering more than 30 cases.12RAA25, Arbitration in the United Arab Emirates: Key Features and Practical Aspects (webinar, Oct. 3, 2024), https://raa25.arbitration.ru/events (event listing and recording link).12

  1. Other Notable Arbitration Institutions

Other significant regional players include the Bahrain Chamber for Dispute Resolution13BAHRAIN CHAMBER FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION, ANNUAL REPORT 2022, at 8–11, available at https://s3.bcdr.org/BCDR_Annual_Report_2022_English.pdf.13 (“BCDR”) and the Saudi Centre for Commercial Arbitration (“SCCA”).14Saudi Center for Commercial Arbitration, Overview, https://www.sadr.org/en/about/overview.14

BCDR, established in 2009 through a partnership with the American Arbitration Association (AAA), operates under its 2022 Arbitration Rules,15BCDR Rules of Arbitration (2022), available at https://s3.bcdr.org/2022-BCDR-Rules-of-Arbitration.pdf.15 which are based on UNCITRAL standards. Bahrain’s arbitration regime is supported by the 2015 Arbitration Law16Law No. 9 of 2015 Promulgating the Arbitration Law, art. 1 (Bahr.), available at https://www.newyorkconvention.org/media/uploads/pdf/4/9/493_bahrain-arbitration-law-no-9-2015.pdf.16 and its long-standing membership in the New York Convention since 1988. The AAA partnership ended in 2022, after which BCDR reported 45 new cases worth US$450 million in its 2022 Annual Report,17BAHRAIN CHAMBER FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 13, at 10, 16–17.17 including a growing sports arbitration docket.

SCCA, established in 2014 in Riyadh and with a regional office in the DIFC since 2023, operates under its 2023 Arbitration Rules.18SCCA Arbitration Rules (2023), available at https://odr.sadr.org/UploadedFiles/Arbitration_Rules_2023_En20230601121453751.pdf.18 These are aligned with international best practices and inspired by UNCITRAL standards. SCCA’s strategic vision is to become the region’s preferred ADR provider by 2030, with its DIFC presence aimed at serving high-value sectors such as construction and finance.

Therefore, the Middle East has moved decisively towards international best practice in arbitration, with the UAE leading through modern legislation, free-zone common law regimes, and increasingly competitive institutions. This provides the backdrop for examining how international sanctions intersect with dispute resolution in the Middle East.

Brief Overview of the Sanctions Landscape in the UAE

A. UAE Sanctions Framework

The UAE has established a legislative and regulatory framework enabling the imposition of targeted financial sanctions, including asset freezes, on legal and natural persons. This framework is designed both to ensure compliance with the UAE’s international obligations and to advance its domestic policy objectives. Sanctions in the UAE are implemented through two principal mechanisms. Firstly, as a United Nations member State, the UAE is bound by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) measures. UNSC resolutions are incorporated into domestic law through Cabinet Decision No. 74 of 2020.1Cabinet Decision No. 74 of 2020 Regarding Terrorism Lists Regulation and Implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions on the Suppression and Combating of Terrorism, Terrorist Financing, Countering the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and its Financing, and Relevant Resolutions (UAE), arts. 1, 15–16, available at https://centralbank.ae/media/rmkpolnq/cabinet-decision-no74-of-2020-regarding-terrorism-lists-regulation-and-unsc-resolutions_0.pdf.1  This mechanism ensures that UNSC sanctions - such as those concerning Al Qaida,2S.C. Res. 1267 (Oct. 15, 1999); S.C. Res. 1989 (June 17, 2011), and subsequent relevant resolutions.2  the Taliban,3S.C. Res. 1988 (June 17, 2011), and subsequent relevant resolutions.3  Yemen4S.C. Res. 2140 (Feb. 26, 2014) (Yemen).4 and South Sudan5S.C. Res. 2206 (Mar. 3, 2015) (South Sudan).5 are enforceable within the UAE.

Secondly, in addition to implementing UNSC measures, the UAE may impose its own autonomous sanctions through the “Local Terrorist List” established under Federal Law No. 7 of 2014 on Combating Terrorism and Crimes.6Federal Law No. 7 of 2014 Combating Terrorism Crimes, art. 63 (UAE), available at https://uaelegislation.gov.ae/en/legislations/1018/download.6  Entities and individuals designated on this include Hezbollah, ISIL, and the Muslim Brotherhood.7UAE Executive Office for Control & Non-Proliferation, The UAE Cabinet Approves the Inclusion of 38 Individuals and 15 Entities in the National Terrorism List (Sept. 13, 2021), https://www.uaeiec.gov.ae/en-us/news/the-uae-cabinet-approves-the-inclusion-of-38-individuals-and-15-entities-in-the-national-terrorism-list.7 Thus, unlike the comprehensive or thematic sanctions regimes maintained by the EU, US, or UK, the UAE’s autonomous sanctions remain narrowly focused on counterterrorism and proliferation financing.

B. Effect of Foreign Sanctions Regimes in the UAE

The UAE is a sovereign jurisdiction whose binding legal norms derive from its federal legislative process, with the authority to enact laws vested in the Federal Supreme Council and the UAE Cabinet. As a matter of UAE law, only those sanctions,  formally enacted or adopted through UAE legislation or executive decision, have legal effect domestically.8Cabinet Decision No. 74 of 2020, supra note 19.8 

Accordingly, unilateral sanctions imposed by foreign authorities - such as those administered by the US Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”), the EU Council, or the UK’s Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (“OFSI”) - do not have legal force in the UAE unless expressly incorporated into UAE law. To date, the UAE has not adopted any foreign jurisdiction’s sanctions regime in whole or in part. This approach aligns with the UAE’s broader policy of maintaining strategic neutrality in international affairs. The UAE seeks to preserve commercial and diplomatic relationships with a wide range of states, including those subject to foreign sanctions elsewhere, and its regulatory posture reflects a deliberate balance between compliance with international obligations and economic openness.

The UAE’s neutral stance is reflected in its long-standing commercial ties with Iranian businesses, many of which are subject to extensive multilateral and unilateral sanctions. More than 8,000 Iranian companies and 6,000 Iranian traders operate in the UAE, with bilateral trade reaching US$17 billion in 2025.9Team MEPEI, Iran and the UAE Are Determined to Expand Business Ties Despite Their Political Disputes, MEPEI (Aug. 24, 2020), https://mepei.com/iran-and-the-uae-are-determined-to-expand-business-ties-despite-their-political-disputes/; Iran’s 10 Month Non-Oil Export to UAE Stands at $5.9b, TEHRAN TIMES (Feb. 12, 2025), https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/509673/Iran-s-10-month-non-oil-export-to-UAE-stands-at-5-9b.9  A similar pattern has emerged with Russian businesses following recent Western sanctions. Over 3,500 Russian companies now operate in the UAE, and bilateral trade reached US$11 billion in 2024.10KazanForum, As Many As 3.5 Thousand Russian Companies Operate in the UAE (May 15, 2025), https://kazanforum.ru/en/press-center/news/12970/.10 

This policy of neutrality has direct implications for dispute resolution. As discussed below, in the UAE, parties subject to foreign sanctions retain full procedural rights in arbitral proceedings and before the courts, unless bound by UAE-implemented measures.

These commercial ties may lead sanctions-affected businesses to choose arbitration in the region, including the UAE, for disputes arising from their cross-border activities.  The practical considerations informing that choice are examined below.

Initiating Arbitration: Western Jurisdiction Challenges and the UAE Approach

A. Licensing Requirements

International sanctions present compliance challenges not only for disputing parties but also for arbitral institutions administering such disputes. In jurisdictions that enforce sanctions, institutions may face administrative, civil, or criminal liability if they fail to comply with applicable regulations. This may require obtaining specific licenses from sanctions authorities. The licensing process can be protracted and unpredictable, creating delays and procedural uncertainty.

More importantly, applying for such licenses may entail disclosing sensitive case information to foreign governmental authorities, including transaction details, banking arrangements, and corporate structures. For many parties, especially in high-value or politically sensitive matters, the disclosure of such information outside the arbitral process raises significant confidentiality concerns. These risks are leading parties to seek neutral venues and arbitration institutions that operate outside the jurisdictions of major sanctions-imposing states. We have noticed an increased demand for DIAC arbitration clauses, reflecting a strategic choice to avoid procedural barriers associated with Western institutions.

In addition, parties are increasingly incorporating cascading (multi-tier) arbitration clauses. These clauses specify an order of preferred institutions, with automatic referral to an alternative venue if sanctions render the first choice unavailable. Well-drafted clauses should define clear and objective triggers—such as, for example, the inability to make required payments within a specified period—reducing the risk of disputes over whether a change of forum is justified. Including a Middle Eastern institution such as DIAC in such clauses ensures continuity if a primary forum is unavailable due to sanctions restrictions.

At present, neither DIAC nor arbitrateAD has published a formal sanctions policy or reported on the volume of sanctions-related cases. However, in public statements at professional forums, both emphasize their neutrality, commitment to access to justice, and readiness to administer disputes involving any party -whether subject to sanctions abroad or not—provided they are not designated under UAE or UNSC measures. In practice, the threshold check consists of verifying whether a party appears on a UN or UAE list; if not, the proceedings may go forward. This reinforces the UAE’s position as a jurisdiction without “unfriendly” parties, where equal procedural rights are afforded to all.1RAA25, supra note 12; St. Petersburg International Legal Forum, DIAC: A Gateway for Russian Companies to Effective Dispute Resolution Abroad (panel discussion), 1

B. Engaging Lawyers and Experts

While legal services for dispute resolution are generally exempt from sanctions in Western jurisdictions, access in practice can still be limited. Counsel in sanctions - imposing states may decline representation due to reputational considerations or the burden of facing payment issues. This can pose practical obstacles in cases where proceedings or related court actions - such as award challenges or applications for interim measures are seated in jurisdictions enforcing sanctions.

In the UAE and other Middle Eastern jurisdictions that have not adopted foreign sanctions regimes, there are no equivalent restrictions. UAE lawyers who are not nationals of sanctions-imposing states may freely represent sanctioned parties, and no licenses or official approvals are required for such representation. This absence of regulatory barriers facilitates the appointment of counsel and experts, even in complex sanctions-related arbitrations.

C. Payment of Arbitration Fees

Sanctions have also complicated the payment of arbitration costs. Banks located in jurisdictions implementing sanctions must comply with those measures. In this respect, arbitration is not fundamentally different from other business transactions currently navigating sanctions-related restrictions. Most European banks, for example, not only follow EU sanctions but also apply US sanctions, either because they form part of multinational groups with a US presence or because they maintain correspondent banking relationships with US institutions. This often results in the blacklisting of sanctioned entities, the freezing of transactions, or the refusal to process payments involving persons designated under the US Specially Designated Nationals (“SDN”) List or equivalent foreign lists.

In arbitration, the payment challenge can be even more acute due to institutional policies. Western arbitral institutions do not accept payments from third parties, requiring that costs be paid directly by a party or its legal representatives. In our practice, one European arbitral institution expressly stated that arbitration costs must be paid either by the client itself or by its counsel. However, the bank could not process the client’s payment due to sanctions compliance restrictions. In another case, a European arbitral institution initially refused to accept payment from counsel, insisting it must come from the party itself, but later made an exception after it became clear that the bank could not execute the party’s transfer. These situations demonstrate how institutional payment policies, when combined with sanctions compliance by banks, can cause procedural delays and uncertainty.

The position in the UAE is markedly different. First, the practical risks and delays associated with sanctions compliance in other jurisdictions are largely avoided when payments are made in UAE dirhams through local banks.

Second, UAE case law confirms that foreign sanctions — such as US OFAC measures — do not have automatic legal effect unless formally adopted under UAE law. A recent illustration is reported in Dubai Court of Appeal Case No. 2437/2024/305 (May 15, 2025).2Dubai Court of Appeal, Case No. 2437/2024/305 (May 15, 2025) (UAE), as reported in Horizons & Co., Dubai Court Clarifies Bank Liability on Sanctions & Fund Transfers (July 9, 2025), https://www.horizlaw.ae/insights/bank-liability-uae-sanctions-dubai-court-ruling.2 According to the published case summary, a corporate claimant sought the return of US$47,666.99 from a UAE-based bank. The bank unilaterally froze the funds, citing potential OFAC violations involving Russian beneficiaries.  The summary doesnot identify the parties. The Dubai Court of First Instance ruled in favor of the claimant, ordering the bank to return the funds with 5% legal interest and costs. The bank appealed, arguing that sanctions legally prevented it from releasing or reversing the transfers. The Court of Appeal rejected the appeal, upholding the lower court’s decision.

This case has been recognized within the UAE legal community as a precedent of practical significance due to the following key findings.3Horizons & Co., supra note 30.3

  • OFAC sanctions are not binding under UAE law unless formally adopted by UAE authorities;
  • UAE law takes precedence over foreign sanctions; reliance on foreign measures without a UAE legal basis is insufficient to justify unilateral action;
  • Compliance measures, however well-intentioned, cannot override contractual obligations absent explicit UAE legal authority;
  • Banks acting solely because of foreign sanctions risk liability for returning funds with interest and costs.

In effect, the UAE’s legal framework and banking environment provide a degree of operational certainty for sanctions-affected parties that is unavailable in many traditional arbitration centers. This reinforces the UAE’s position as a practical and procedurally secure venue for initiating arbitration in disputes with a sanction element.

Arbitration Proceedings: Western Jurisdiction Challenges and the UAE Approach

A. Arbitral Tribunal

Sanctions create significant challenges in the appointment of arbitrators and experts, affecting their ability to participate in proceedings and receive payments. In some cases, arbitrators and experts are legally required to obtain licenses from sanctions regulators before engaging in arbitration involving sanctioned entities. Arbitrators face parallel challenges: a UK arbitrator, for instance, must comply with British sanctions regardless of the seat, while extraterritorial US sanctions might deter a non-US arbitrator in a US-seated case. Concerns over reputational risk, secondary sanctions, and legal exposure further discourage arbitrators from accepting appointments in such disputes. Additionally, disagreements between parties on the selection of arbitrators — especially when one side insists on non-sanctioning state appointees — can impact arbitration proceedings. The situation becomes more complex if a party is designated after the tribunal has been constituted, potentially necessitating the replacement of arbitrators and restarting proceedings. As a result, the pool of available and willing candidates is narrower, slowing the constitution process.

By contrast, the UAE offers a pragmatic alternative. Arbitrators based in the UAE—or elsewhere in the Middle East—who are not nationals of sanctions-imposing countries operate without the need for complex approvals. Local arbitrators are less constrained by Western sanctions regimes and can offer neutrality and regional expertise.

B. Witness Participation

Sanctions can also obstruct the physical participation of witnesses and party representatives in hearings, particularly where travel bans, visa denials, or entry restrictions apply. While remote testimony offers a practical alternative, it can be sub-optimal in cases where credibility and the depth of cross-examination are critical. Virtual participation may limit the immediacy of questioning, hinder interpretation, or create unequal conditions between parties.

A recent example demonstrates how the UAE can facilitate in-person testimony otherwise blocked in Western jurisdictions. In Gorbachev v Guriev [2024] EWHC 247 (Comm),1Gorbachev v. Guriev, [2024] EWHC (Comm) 2174, ¶ 3 (Eng.), available at https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Gorbachev-v-Guriev-final-for-handdown.pdf (recounting the order in Gorbachev v. Guriev, [2024] EWHC (Comm) 247).1 Russian nationals subject to UK sanctions were unable to enter the UK to give evidence in High Court proceedings. HHJ Pelling KC devised a solution by appointing himself as a “special examiner” to take their evidence abroad. As specified in para. 3 of the judgment:

One of the reasons that both parties sought this order was because the defendant (unlike the claimant) does not speak English and his evidence would have to be given via interpreters. Mr Stanley was concerned that in a case that depends upon the detailed testing of oral evidence, cross-examination via an interpreter with only remote access would create avoidable obstacles to a fair cross-examination by him of the defendant whereas Mr Weisselberg KC (who acted for the defendant on the application) was equally concerned that it would be unfair for the defendant to have to give evidence in this way when the claimant was able to give evidence in person. As things turned out there was a clear benefit in the defendant’s evidence being given in the manner I ordered.

The examination was conducted in the DIFC in May 2024—the first time an English judge has undertaken such a role in the UAE. The DIFC’s common-law framework, procedural sophistication, and neutrality made it an ideal venue.

This case underscores the DIFC’s potential as a location for evidence gathering in both court and arbitral proceedings when sanctions prevent participation in traditional venues. It also illustrates the broader adaptability of Middle Eastern jurisdictions compared to the procedural rigidity often encountered in Western venues.

C. Access to Third-Party Funding

Sanctions can also indirectly limit a party’s ability to finance its case. Where sanctioned parties’ assets are frozen abroad, they may be unable to use those funds to pay for arbitration costs, even when they have strong claims. The passage of limitation periods can exacerbate the problem, as proceedings cannot be launched until financing is secured.

Third-party funding offers a potential solution. While funders based in sanctions-imposing countries are unlikely to finance sanctioned parties, there is a small but growing pool of funders in neutral jurisdictions, including the UAE, who may consider such cases. Their involvement will depend on the strength of the claim, the enforceability of a potential award, and the location of the respondent’s assets. If enforcement prospects exist in jurisdictions outside the sanctions-imposing states — particularly in the Middle East —the likelihood of funding approval increases. Although funding decisions are made case by case, the very availability of such funding in the UAE provides sanctioned parties with an avenue that may not exist in many Western jurisdictions.

Enforcement of Arbitral Awards: Western Jurisdiction Challenges and the UAE Approach

A. Enforcement Risks in Sanctions-Imposing Jurisdictions

Enforcement remains a critical pressure point in sanctions-affected arbitration. Under both the 1958 New York Convention1Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, supra note 1, art. V(2)(b).1 and the UNCITRAL Model Law2UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, supra note 1, art. 36(1)(b)(ii).2, the primary ground for refusing enforcement of an arbitral award in the sanctions context is a finding that enforcement would contravene the public policy (order public) of the enforcing state.3New York Convention, supra note 1, art. V(2)(b); UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 1, art. 36(1)(b)(ii) (permitting refusal of enforcement on public policy grounds).3

In many jurisdictions, sanctions—particularly those imposed for foreign policy or national security reasons—are considered part of public policy. This allows courts to refuse enforcement of awards in favor of sanctioned entities or awards that fail to consider sanctions applicable in that state. In practice, this means that the impact of sanctions on enforcement depends entirely on the jurisdiction where recognition and enforcement are sought. An award that is enforceable in one state may be refused in another on the basis that it conflicts with that state’s sanctions regime. This remains true even if the award is rendered by a respected arbitral institution such as Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre (HKIAC) or Singapore International Arbitration Centre (SIAC) and seated in a neutral state. The identity of the seat or the institution does not override the enforcing court’s public policy analysis. This variability injects considerable uncertainty into the enforcement process for parties facing sanctions.

B. The UAE Enforcement Landscape

The UAE’s sanctions framework and its deliberate policy of not adopting unilateral sanctions from other states create a materially different enforcement environment. While UAE mainland courts may refuse enforcement based on domestic (UAE or UNSC) sanctions, they are unlikely to do so solely because an award conflicts with foreign sanctions. This neutrality offers a degree of predictability for parties seeking enforcement of awards involving sanctioned entities. In theory, this approach could extend to upholding awards in favor of parties sanctioned abroad, provided no UAE or UN sanctions apply. While the UAE’s theoretical openness is promising, forthcoming case law will determine whether this neutrality endures under the test of politically sensitive enforcement applications.

Conclusion

International commercial arbitration remains one of the most reliable mechanisms for resolving cross-border disputes, including in the context of sanctions. Its supranational nature, institutional independence, and global enforceability under the 1958 New York Convention make it particularly valuable in sanctions-affected disputes. However, arbitral institutions must still comply with the sanctions regimes in force in their host jurisdictions, creating procedural and practical challenges for sanctioned parties, their counsel, arbitrators, and the institutions themselves. Thus, the choice of forum becomes critical. Sanctioned parties increasingly look to neutral jurisdictions to avoid the licensing requirements, delays, and administrative burdens often encountered in Western arbitration centers. While European institutions are making efforts to adapt, bureaucratic processes and the need for regulator involvement frequently undermine efficiency. Selecting a neutral forum requires more than simply finding a jurisdiction without relevant sanctions — it requires a developed legal system capable of supporting fair proceedings and consistent enforcement.

The UAE exemplifies this approach. Its legal framework ensures equal access to justice for all parties, without “unfriendly” designations, and its institutions are committed to neutrality and procedural fairness. The UAE’s demonstrated neutrality, procedural resilience, and growing institutional capacity position it as a credible and strategically attractive venue for sanctions-affected arbitration. As global sanctions regimes evolve, the UAE’s future case law and enforcement record will determine whether this theoretical openness consistently delivers in practice.

Endnotes

1Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, arts. III–V, 330 U.N.T.S. 38, available at https://uncitral.un.org/sites/default/files/media-documents/uncitral/en/1958nyconvention.pdf; UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (1985), with amendments as adopted in 2006, available at https://uncitral.un.org/en/texts/arbitration/modellaw/commercial_arbitration; UNCITRAL, Status: UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, https://uncitral.un.org/en/texts/arbitration/modellaw/commercial_arbitration/status.
2Federal Law No. 6 of 2018 Concerning Arbitration, as amended by Federal Decree-Law No. 15 of 2023 (UAE), available at https://uaelegislation.gov.ae/en/legislations/1069/download.
3Arbitration Law, DIFC Law No. 1 of 2008, as amended by DIFC Law No. 1 of 2013, arts. 7, 42–44, available at https://assets.difc.com/v1/media/edge/images/dubaiintern0078-difcexperie96c5-production-3253/media/project/difcexperiences/difc/difcwebsite/documents/laws--regulations/arbitration_law_difc_law_no_1_of_2008.pdf.
4ADGM Arbitration Regulations 2015, §§ 3, 6, available at https://en.adgm.thomsonreuters.com/sites/default/files/net_file_store/Arbitration_Regulations_2015_English.pdf.
5David Samuels & Jack Ballantyne, GAR 100 Data Report: What Is the “Average” International Arbitration?, GLOBAL ARBITRATION REVIEW (2024), https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/gar-100-data-report-what-the-average-international-arbitration.
6QUEEN MARY UNIVERSITY OF LONDON & WHITE & CASE, 2025 INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION SURVEY: THE PATH FORWARD—REALITIES AND OPPORTUNITIES IN ARBITRATION 6–8 (2025), available at https://www.qmul.ac.uk/arbitration/media/arbitration/docs/White-Case-QMUL-2025-International-Arbitration-Survey-report.pdf.
7Id. at 7.
8DUBAI INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION CENTRE, ANNUAL REPORT 2023, available at https://www.diac.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/DIAC-Annual-Report-2023.pdf.
9Samuels & Ballantyne, supra note 5.
10DIAC Arbitration Rules (2022), arts. 8–9, 32, app. II, art. 2, available at https://www.diac.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/0.1-DIAC-Casework-2022-Arbitration-Rules.pdf.
11Opus 2, DIAC and Opus 2 Announce Partnership to Enhance Dispute Resolution Experience (Jan. 21, 2025), https://www.opus2.com/resources/news/diac-and-opus-2-partnership/.
12RAA25, Arbitration in the United Arab Emirates: Key Features and Practical Aspects (webinar, Oct. 3, 2024), https://raa25.arbitration.ru/events (event listing and recording link).
13BAHRAIN CHAMBER FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION, ANNUAL REPORT 2022, at 8–11, available at https://s3.bcdr.org/BCDR_Annual_Report_2022_English.pdf.
14Saudi Center for Commercial Arbitration, Overview, https://www.sadr.org/en/about/overview.
15BCDR Rules of Arbitration (2022), available at https://s3.bcdr.org/2022-BCDR-Rules-of-Arbitration.pdf.
16Law No. 9 of 2015 Promulgating the Arbitration Law, art. 1 (Bahr.), available at https://www.newyorkconvention.org/media/uploads/pdf/4/9/493_bahrain-arbitration-law-no-9-2015.pdf.
17BAHRAIN CHAMBER FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 13, at 10, 16–17.
18SCCA Arbitration Rules (2023), available at https://odr.sadr.org/UploadedFiles/Arbitration_Rules_2023_En20230601121453751.pdf.
19Cabinet Decision No. 74 of 2020 Regarding Terrorism Lists Regulation and Implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions on the Suppression and Combating of Terrorism, Terrorist Financing, Countering the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and its Financing, and Relevant Resolutions (UAE), arts. 1, 15–16, available at https://centralbank.ae/media/rmkpolnq/cabinet-decision-no74-of-2020-regarding-terrorism-lists-regulation-and-unsc-resolutions_0.pdf.
20S.C. Res. 1267 (Oct. 15, 1999); S.C. Res. 1989 (June 17, 2011), and subsequent relevant resolutions.
21S.C. Res. 1988 (June 17, 2011), and subsequent relevant resolutions.
22S.C. Res. 2140 (Feb. 26, 2014) (Yemen).
23S.C. Res. 2206 (Mar. 3, 2015) (South Sudan).
24Federal Law No. 7 of 2014 Combating Terrorism Crimes, art. 63 (UAE), available at https://uaelegislation.gov.ae/en/legislations/1018/download.
25UAE Executive Office for Control & Non-Proliferation, The UAE Cabinet Approves the Inclusion of 38 Individuals and 15 Entities in the National Terrorism List (Sept. 13, 2021), https://www.uaeiec.gov.ae/en-us/news/the-uae-cabinet-approves-the-inclusion-of-38-individuals-and-15-entities-in-the-national-terrorism-list.
26Cabinet Decision No. 74 of 2020, supra note 19.
27Team MEPEI, Iran and the UAE Are Determined to Expand Business Ties Despite Their Political Disputes, MEPEI (Aug. 24, 2020), https://mepei.com/iran-and-the-uae-are-determined-to-expand-business-ties-despite-their-political-disputes/; Iran’s 10 Month Non-Oil Export to UAE Stands at $5.9b, TEHRAN TIMES (Feb. 12, 2025), https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/509673/Iran-s-10-month-non-oil-export-to-UAE-stands-at-5-9b.
28KazanForum, As Many As 3.5 Thousand Russian Companies Operate in the UAE (May 15, 2025), https://kazanforum.ru/en/press-center/news/12970/.
29RAA25, supra note 12; St. Petersburg International Legal Forum, DIAC: A Gateway for Russian Companies to Effective Dispute Resolution Abroad (panel discussion),
30Dubai Court of Appeal, Case No. 2437/2024/305 (May 15, 2025) (UAE), as reported in Horizons & Co., Dubai Court Clarifies Bank Liability on Sanctions & Fund Transfers (July 9, 2025), https://www.horizlaw.ae/insights/bank-liability-uae-sanctions-dubai-court-ruling.
31Horizons & Co., supra note 30.
32Gorbachev v. Guriev, [2024] EWHC (Comm) 2174, ¶ 3 (Eng.), available at https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Gorbachev-v-Guriev-final-for-handdown.pdf (recounting the order in Gorbachev v. Guriev, [2024] EWHC (Comm) 247).
33Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, supra note 1, art. V(2)(b).
34UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, supra note 1, art. 36(1)(b)(ii).
35New York Convention, supra note 1, art. V(2)(b); UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 1, art. 36(1)(b)(ii) (permitting refusal of enforcement on public policy grounds).
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About the Contributors
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Partner & Head of Dubai Office, TA Advisory (UAE)

Ais is a triple-qualified lawyer (England & Wales, Ireland, and Russia) specialising in sanctions and international arbitration. She has acted as counsel in high-value arbitration proceedings under the rules of leading institutions, including the ICC, LCIA, SCC, ICAC, and the Swiss Arbitration Centre, as well as in ad hoc arbitrations conducted under the UNCITRAL Rules. In addition to her counsel work, she also sits as an arbitrator and is listed with the Dubai International Arbitration Centre (DIAC, UAE), arbitrateAD (NextGen arbitrator, UAE) the Energy Disputes Arbitration Centre (EDAC, Turkey), and the Astana International Arbitration Centre (AIAC, Kazakhstan).

 

Ais is recognised by Best Lawyers for her work in International Arbitration, Arbitration and Mediation. She has also been named a Rising Arbitrator by the Rising Arbitrators Initiative and a NextGen Arbitrator.

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Junior Associate, TA Advisory (UAE)

Chayma is a legal professional with a strong academic foundation in commercial and international law, with a particular focus on dispute resolution. She completed her legal education at prestigious universities in Abu Dhabi (Bachelor in Law) and Dubai (LL.M. in International Commercial Law).

Chayma advises international clients on complex cross-border disputes, arbitration proceedings, and the enforcement of arbitral awards in the UAE. Her industry focus spans banking and finance, commodities, construction, real estate and technology. Chayma gained experience in leading UAE law firms, where she developed her legal skills in dispute resolution.