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Issue 1

Do Courts Go Too Far—Or Not Far Enough? Contractual Modification of Judicial Review and Its Limits in International Arbitration

Any basic definition of arbitration inevitably highlights its consensual nature.  Arbitration is, in a widely accepted formulation, “a creature that owes its existence to the will of parties alone.”1Gary Born, Legal Framework for International Arbitration Agreements, in INT’L COM. ARB. § 2.01 (3d. ed. 2021) (citing Dell Computer Corp. v. Union des Consommateurs, [2007] SCC 34, ¶ 51 (Can.)).1  While this characterization captures a core element of arbitration, it can give the misleading impression that every aspect of the process is entirely dictated by party autonomy.  This overly reductive view overlooks the fact that arbitration also serves an adjudicatory function.  Accordingly, it must meet certain minimum standards of due process; including, for instance, ensuring that each party has a material opportunity to present their legal positions and proof before a neutral decision-maker under a fair and impartial procedure.2Id. § 2.02[C][4].2 

The tension between the consensual and adjudicatory nature of arbitration invites the question whether party autonomy extends so far as to allow the parties to waive, narrow, or even expand the grounds for vacating or refusing to enforce an award.  In other words, even after the arbitral process has concluded, doubts persist as to whether parties can retain full control over the procedural design, including its reviewability.

This article thus examines the implications of contractual modifications to judicial review in international arbitration.  It begins by explaining why reassessing the design of the arbitral process has become particularly salient today, against the backdrop of recent arbitral awards and judicial decisions that have exposed the practical consequences of the default framework of judicial review—often leading parties, in hindsight, to wish they had reduced or expanded the scope of court intervention after the award is rendered (Part I).  It then outlines the competing perspectives on whether parties should be allowed to reduce, expand, or waive altogether the scope of judicial review of arbitral awards (Part II).  Building on this debate, the article proposes a flexible framework that seeks to map the boundaries of contractual modification of judicial review by identifying the grounds that are commonly regarded as resistant to waiver because they reflect core sovereign or public interests, while also considering how limited forms of contractual expansion may be accommodated within those boundaries (Part III).  Finally, the article examines recent case law from jurisdictions that have accepted contractual expansions or restrictions of judicial review, assessing whether these mechanisms have, in practice, succeeded in addressing the concerns that have fueled calls for reform (Part IV).

Reassessing Judicial Review in Arbitration: Lessons from Recent Cases

As anticipated, the question on contractual modification of judicial review becomes even more relevant when we take into account a steadily growing, but persistent potential crisis of the contractual nature of arbitration.  While arbitration is an expression of party autonomy even at the post-award stage, insofar it presumes self-imposed limitations by the parties on the scope of review of the award,1Hamish Lal & Brendan Casey, “Arbitral Innovation” or “Tribunal Overreach”: A Call for Renewed Focus on Party Autonomy in the Time of Arbitral Rules Expansion, 31 Am. Rev. Int’l Arb. 291, 291 (2020).1 recurring concerns about arbitral fallibility and the perceived need for additional procedural safeguards to correct mistaken awards have gradually diminished satisfaction with what was once considered one of arbitration’s defining advantages: the finality of the award and the exclusion of appeals.2Michael Wietzorek, Agreements on an Expanded Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards, in 2014 Austrian Y.B. Int’l Arb. 343 (Christian Klausegger et al. eds., 2014).2 

At the same time, and in contrast to these developments, the classic objection to expanding judicial review to allow for review on the merits persists.  That objection centers on the fear that increased court intervention threatens arbitral autonomy and undermines the legal stability of arbitral awards by subjecting disputes to a duplicative process—first before the arbitral tribunal, and subsequently before domestic courts.3Choong-Lyong Ha, The Finality of Arbitral Awards: The U.S. Practices, 30 J. Arb. Stud. 3, 5 (2020).3 

Against this backdrop, two recent cases from markedly different jurisdictions capture, from opposite ends of the spectrum, the conditions under which the expansion or, conversely, the restriction of judicial review appears most compelling.  Section A examines a Chilean set-aside proceeding, where the narrow scope of annulment review could leave serious allegations of arbitral error without an effective judicial remedy.  Section B turns to a recent decision of the Indian Supreme Court, illustrating the opposite concern—namely, the risk that judicial intervention may drift toward an appellate reconsideration of the award.

A.  The Chilean Set-Aside Proceedings: Excessive Restraint and the Limits of Annulment Review

The first case (Joyvio Grp. Co., Ltd.  v. Quiroga Moreno) is a highly controversial arbitral decision rendered in Chile in 2025,4Joyvio Grp. Co. v. Quiroga Moreno, CAM Santiago Case No. A-5.484-2023, Award (May 22, 2025).4 that has revealed how an inflexible approach to restricted judicial review can amplify the costs of arbitral error and, in doing so, underscores the unease of those who argue that the prevailing limits on court intervention may, in certain circumstances, prove overly rigid.

The case arose in the context of Chile’s salmon industry, one of the country’s most important economic sectors, and concerned an M&A dispute involving the effect of the buyer’s prior knowledge of inaccuracies in representations and warranties where the contract did not include sandbagging or anti-sandbagging provisions.5José Joaquín Ugarte, Award Rendered in Multimillionaire Chilean Salmon Saga: Hot Topics and Set-Aside Key Aspects, Kluwer Arb. Blog (Nov. 19, 2025), https://legalblogs.wolterskluwer.com/arbitration-blog/award-rendered-in-multimillionaire-chilean-salmon-saga-hot-topics-and-set-aside-key-aspects.5  The dispute stemmed from the acquisition of a major Chilean salmon producer—Australis—by a Chinese agribusiness group, giving rise to allegations that material regulatory and operational issues had not been adequately disclosed to the buyer during the transaction process.6Id.6  The majority of the tribunal ultimately found in favor of the buyer, determining that the seller had made inadequate representations about Australis’ situation, and awarded damages of US $217.2 million plus interest, based on its own recalculation of the purchase price.7Joyvio, supra note 6; see also Caroline Simson, Chinese Co. Looks to Enforce $217M Salmon Farming Award, Law360 (Aug. 19, 2025), https://www.law360.com/articles/2378318/chinese-co-looks-to-enforce-217m-salmon-farming-award.7 

The arbitration attracted significant attention, not only because of the size and complexity of the transaction, but also due to the subsequent efforts to challenge the validity of the award.8Jack Ballantyne, Chilean Salmon Award Reaches U.S. Courts, Glob. Arb. Rev. (Aug. 19, 2025), https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/chilean-salmon-award-reaches-us-courts.8  Reports on the final award pointed out that it was inconsistent with the tribunal’s findings and the claimant’s relief sought, as the majority granted relief that was never pleaded in the arbitration, allegedly with the aim of avoiding the limitation of liability clauses provided by the sale contract.9Id.; see also Joyvio, supra note 6.9  The August 2025 award was subsequently challenged by the sellers and former owners of Australis, who contended that the violations identified in the tribunal’s reasoning were “extremely grave”10Christian Molinari, Quiroga Family Defense Calls for Award in Australis Case to Be Annulled, SeafoodSource (Oct. 8, 2025), https://www.seafoodsource.com/news/supply-trade/quiroga-family-defense-calls-for-award-in-australis-case-to-be-annulled.10 and “repugnant to the most elementary sense of morality and justice.”11Id.11 

Notably, the seller’s petition for award annulment was supported by the expert opinion of leading, widely recognized authorities in international arbitration.  Gary Born reportedly concluded that the award “[was] in many respects among the most egregiously flawed rulings” he had seen in his career, and that its annulment “will properly incentivize arbitrators in Chile and elsewhere to do their job correctly.”12Ugarte, supra note 7.12  Likewise, Yves Derains suggested in his own opinion there can be no doubt the award would be annulled in almost every country in the world.13Ballantyne, supra note 10.13  The president of the Madrid International Arbitration Center, Jose Maria Alonso; former non-permanent justice of the Chilean Supreme Court, Daniel Peñailillo; and Raúl Tavolari, founder of the Chilean Institute of Procedural Law, all submitted additional expert reports to support the sellers’ set-aside petition.14Id.14

The involvement of so many prominent figures in international arbitration underscores the broader significance of this award within the Chilean legal framework, as well as its potential implications for how judicial review of arbitral awards is understood and applied in Chile.  The opinions submitted by these experts, together with the assessments of local counsel who have reviewed the award, consistently contend that the tribunal conducted a legal analysis disconnected from the buyer’s claims and instead relied on legal grounds not advanced by the parties—an approach incompatible with fundamental principles of international arbitration.15Id.15 

Chile—long regarded as a jurisdiction that is not particularly receptive to annulment applications, and in which no set-aside petition has ever been granted—now confronts a defining question.16Ugarte, supra note 7.16  The Chilean courts must determine whether the public policy and ultra petita violations invoked by the sellers suffice to invalidate the award,17Petición de nulidad de laudo arbitral, Asesorías e Inversiones Benjamín S.A. et al. v. Food Investment SpA et al., Corte de Apelaciones de Santiago (filed Aug. 2025) (Chile).17 or whether, notwithstanding the seriousness of the alleged flaws, the award must stand under the narrowly circumscribed grounds for annulment permitted by Chilean law.18On June 24, 2026, the Santiago Court of Appeals granted the annulment petition, marking the first annulment of an international arbitral award in Chile. The Court held that the award exceeded the scope of the arbitration agreement under Article 34(2)(a)(iii) of Law No. 19,971 (LACI) because it granted relief based on a different cause of action than the one pleaded and litigated by the parties. Having found this specific ground for annulment established, the Court declined to uphold the remaining grounds invoked, including the public policy challenge. Joyvio Grp. Co. v. Quiroga Moreno, No. Civil-17067-2025, Judgment of the Santiago Court of Appeals (June 24, 2026).18  

The scope of this inquiry is, however, sharply constrained by Chile’s lex arbitri.  Law No. 19,971 (LACI) mirrors the language annulment grounds set out in Article 34 of the UNCITRAL Model Law19UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, art. 34, U.N. Doc. A/40/17, annex I (1985), as amended in 2006, providing that: “(1) Recourse to a court against an arbitral award may be made only by an application for setting aside in accordance with paragraphs (2) and (3) of this article. (2) An arbitral award may be set aside by the court specified in article 6 only if: (a) the party making the application furnishes proof that: (ii) the party making the application was not given proper notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbitral proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case; (iii) the award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration; (b) the court finds that: (ii) the award is in conflict with the public policy of this State” (excerpted).19 and does not provide for any expansion of judicial review that would subject the award to an appeal on the merits.20Ley No. 19.971 sobre Arbitraje Comercial Internacional, art. 34, Diario Oficial [D.O.], Sept. 29, 2004 (Chile).20  Moreover, the Constitutional Court has recently reinforced the limited jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals when reviewing arbitral awards in annulment proceedings, holding that the term “only” used in Article 34 of the LACI—consistent with the wording of the UNCITRAL Model Law—operates as a restriction both on the admissibility of set-aside petitions and on the scope of the available grounds for annulment.21Elina Mereminskaya, When “Only” Is Not Just Another Word: The Chilean Constitutional Court Upholds the Constitutionality of the Term in Article 34 of Law on International Commercial Arbitration, Kluwer Arb. Blog (Mar. 19, 2025), https://legalblogs.wolterskluwer.com/arbitration-blog/when-only-is-not-just-another-word-the-chilean-constitutional-court-upholds-the-constitutionality-of-the-term-in-article-34-of-law-on-international-commercial-arbitration.21 

In that sense, the Chilean award exemplifies how the rigidity of the prevailing model of judicial review may leave parties without an effective avenue to address serious allegations of arbitral error.  This rigidity may, in turn, exacerbate ex-post dissatisfaction with the limitations of the system and prompt reflection on whether a more flexible, contractually agreed mechanism of review might have been preferable.

B.  The Indian Supreme Court’s Intervention: Modification of Awards and the Risk of Appellate Review

The second case, at the other end of the spectrum, consists of the highly discussed Balasamy judgment delivered by the Supreme Court of India in April 2025.22See Gayatri Balasamy v. ISG Novasoft Technologies Ltd., 2025 INSC 605 (India); Court’s Power to Modify an Arbitral Award, Sup. Ct. Observer, https://www.scobserver.in/cases/courts-power-to-modify-an-arbitral-award-gayatri-balasamy-v-m-s-isg-novasoft-technologies-ltd.22  This ruling is viewed as a shift from the prevailing position of this jurisdiction aiming for a minimal judicial intervention, as it weakens such doctrine by allowing the Indian Supreme Court to modify arbitral awards in the exercise of its set-aside jurisdiction.23Karshana Agarwal & Tanay Dubey, Arbitration’s USP at Stake? Supreme Court Settles the Debate Over Judicial Modification of Awards in India, Kluwer Arb. Blog (July 25, 2025), https://legalblogs.wolterskluwer.com/arbitration-blog/arbitrations-usp-at-stake-supreme-court-settles-the-debate-over-judicial-modification-of-awards-in-india.23  In other words, the power to set aside an award is now understood to include the power to partially set it aside or, where appropriate, to modify it.24Id.24 

Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, the Indian lex arbitri, allows courts to set aside arbitral awards on specific grounds, yet it does not expressly confer upon courts the power to modify or vary them.25Arbitration and Conciliation Act, No. 26 of 1996, § 34 (Aug. 16, 1996) (India).25  This statutory silence has generated uncertainty, as some courts have interpreted their powers narrowly, while others have adopted a more interventionist approach, allowing them to modify awards where an error is perceived.26Modification of Awards: India’s Supreme Court Redefines Scope of Judicial Interference, Glob. Arb. Rev. (June 20, 2025), https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/modification-of-awards-indias-supreme-court-redefines-scope-of-judicial-interference.26  Against this background, the Balasamy ruling has come to be regarded as a long-awaited pronouncement by the Indian Supreme Court on an unsettled issue in Indian arbitration law.27Id.27 

In its decision, the Court reasoned that, where an award contains parts that can be clearly separated both legally and in practice, courts may limit their intervention to the defective portion by setting aside or modifying only that part of the award.28Agarwal & Dubey, supra note 25.28  At the same time, the Court emphasized that such intervention should not involve a re-examination of the facts or a review of the merits of the dispute.29Id.29  This approach therefore opened the door for national courts to engage with the substance of the tribunal’s legal reasoning, notwithstanding the formal prohibition on revisiting the merits.

The Supreme Court’s conclusion, however, was not unanimously shared.  In a dissent supported by some experts, Justice Vishwanathan distinguished between the power to set aside an award and the power to modify it, noting that while the former ensures judicial oversight, the latter is inherently appellate in nature.30Susannah Moody, Indian Supreme Court Rules on Power to Modify Awards, Glob. Arb. Rev. (May 2, 2025), https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/indian-supreme-court-rules-power-modify-awards.30  According to his dissent, the power to modify an award cannot be implied within the power to set it aside.31Id.31 

Thus, the Indian ruling illustrates a context in which clear and express limitations on a court’s power to review an arbitral award may be desirable.  From the parties’ perspective, an explicit agreement restricting judicial intervention—for instance, by prohibiting unilateral judicial modification of the award and requiring that any necessary adjustments be remitted to the arbitral tribunal—may represent a preferable approach to preserving arbitral autonomy and safeguarding arbitration’s core advantages.32Kenneth M. Curtin, An Examination of Contractual Expansion and Limitation of Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards, 15 Ohio St. J. On Disp. Resol. 358 (2000) (“If, after a successful arbitration, such parties still are faced with prolonged and costly award enforcement litigation in a foreign court, all the benefits of arbitration would be destroyed, especially the neutral forum so cherished by participants in international trade.”).32  This consideration is particularly relevant in jurisdictions where confidence in the judiciary is limited and where parties prioritize maintaining a meaningful separation between arbitration and court control.33Id.33 

Taken together, these cases illustrate how dissatisfaction with judicial review may arise both from an overly restrictive framework and from excessive judicial intervention, pointing to the need for a more carefully calibrated, contractually designed approach to post-award review.

Flexible vs. Mandatory Standards: Competing Approaches to Judicial Review

This is where party autonomy—as the core basis of arbitration—comes into play.  As a foundational principle of arbitration, party autonomy reflects the idea that parties are generally free to design the mechanisms through which their disputes are resolved, provided that such arrangements do not exceed the limits imposed by public policy.1Lal & Casey, supra note 3, at 293.1  From this perspective, it follows logically that parties may also seek to determine the procedures through which an arbitral decision is subject to post-award review.2 Id. at 291.2 

It is precisely from this understanding of party autonomy that two opposing—yet closely related—debates emerge.  Some argue that party autonomy justifies the reduction or even elimination of judicial review, in order to maximize finality and efficiency.  Others contend that party autonomy may equally support the expansion of judicial review, allowing courts a broader role in correcting legal or substantive errors.  Sections A and B examine these competing positions in turn:  Section A addresses the arguments for and against narrowing or waiving judicial review, while Section B considers the case for, as well as the objections to its contractual expansion.

A.  The Case for Narrowing or Waiving Judicial Review

The discussion on the validity and enforceability of agreements that narrow or eliminate the existing grounds for judicial review brings into focus opposing views on how far parties should be allowed to renounce procedural guarantees, and whether arbitral awards can—or should—be rendered immune from judicial scrutiny.  As will be discussed, full liberty to waive may appear particularly striking when, after all, the grounds for judicial review of an award recognized both under the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention) and the UNCITRAL Model Law are already extremely narrow and limited in scope, as they are designed to address only the most serious procedural or jurisdictional irregularities.3Nigel Blackaby et al., Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration ¶¶ 10.65–10.66 (7th ed. 2023) (“[T]he balance has come down overwhelmingly in favour of finality and against judicial review of substance, except in very limited circumstances. . . . In the middle of the scale, a large number of states have adopted (either in full or with some modifications) the limited grounds of recourse laid down in the Model Law, which mirror the grounds for refusal of enforcement under the New York Convention.”); see also Reinmar Wolff, Party Autonomy to Agree on Non Final Arbitration?, 26 ASA Bull. 626, 626–41 (2008) (“Consistently, awards can only be set aside due to fundamental formal flaws.  This limited review warrants the equivalence of an award and a state court judgment.”).3 

On the one hand, proponents of broader party autonomy argue that limiting judicial review even further is consistent with the very rationale of arbitration—namely, to avoid the costs, delays, and complexities of national court litigation.4Curtin, supra note 34, at 357.4  From this perspective, judicial intervention at the enforcement stage may undermine the efficiency and finality that parties sought when choosing arbitration in the first place.5Id.5  In support of this view, it is often noted that the drafters of modern arbitration legislation and the New York Convention envisioned a system in which national courts would not only recognize and enforce arbitration agreements, but also give full effect to the resulting awards.6Id. at 361.6  Thus, contractual limitations of judicial review may be acceptable so long as they do not frustrate these two foundational goals: making arbitration a reliable and autonomous alternative to litigation, while preserving its overall integrity.7Id.7

At its core, this position rests on the belief that there is no compelling reason to prevent parties—particularly sophisticated ones—from assuming the consequences of waiving judicial review.8Born, supra note 1, § 25.07[A][1] (“There is substantial force to these comments, but where sophisticated companies freely decide that they wish to forego any review in annulment proceedings, it is difficult to see why that agreement should not be given effect, save in the most extraordinary circumstances (e.g., involving post hoc fraud or similar wrongdoing).”).8  If the parties have knowingly accepted the risks associated with limiting recourse against an award, then denying them that autonomy would be both paternalistic and inconsistent with the consensual foundation of arbitration.9Id.9  This logic has been endorsed by Swiss courts, which have emphasized that parties capable of bearing the consequences of such a waiver should be allowed to do so, especially when their goal is to avoid unnecessary state intervention that could compromise the confidentiality of the proceedings or delay the swift and final resolution of the dispute.10Id. (citing Tribunal fédéral [TF] Jan. 4, 2012, 4A_238/2011, ¶ 3.2 (Switz.)).10 

Such arguments are often invoked in support of allowing a complete and unconditional waiver of all judicial grounds for review.11Id.11  The underlying rationale is that, just as parties are allowed to waive access to national courts by agreeing to arbitration, or to opt for adjudication ex aequo et bono or by an amiable compositeur, they should likewise be free to waive post-award judicial scrutiny in annulment or enforcement proceedings.12Id.12 

On the other hand, opposition to the contractual limitation of judicial review rests on concerns about either the removal of fundamental legal protections for the parties or, more broadly, the legitimacy of arbitration within the judicial system.13George Bermann, Party Autonomy to Vary the Standards for Annulment, in Int’l Arb. & Priv. Int’l L. 405, ¶ 615 (2017).13  Contenders typically argue that grounds for judicial review serve as safeguards against arbitrariness, corruption, or bias in “private justice.”14Id.14  In particular, critics stress that judicial scrutiny becomes unnegotiable when arbitral tribunals issue decisions that interpret the law and produce binding legal effects for the parties—functions that, in their view, should not be exercised entirely outside the control of the judicial system.15Id. (“[S]o that no adjudicatory decision purporting to apply the law should be completely immune from judicial review.”).15

A further objection lies in the idea that the scope of judicial review is not only a procedural safeguard, but a matter of public authority defined by statute.  In this sense, the rules governing judicial review of arbitral awards—like those governing review of judicial decisions—are prescribed by law and determine the limits of courts’ adjudicatory power.  Just as private parties cannot, through contract, expand the grounds on which a court may review its own decisions, they likewise cannot narrow or eliminate the statutory grounds for reviewing arbitral awards.16Hans Smit, Contractual Modifications of the Arbitral Process, 113 Penn St. L. Rev. 1000 (2009).16  Moreover, it has also been argued that removing all forms of judicial scrutiny creates obvious risks, including the potential for inconsistent outcomes and the possibility that arbitrators may not approach their task with the level of competence and care they otherwise would if subject to review.17John Terry et al., Substantive Grounds for Challenge, in THE GUIDE TO CHALLENGING AND ENFORCING ARBITRATION AWARDS (3d ed.), https://globalarbitrationreview.com/guide/the-guide-challenging-and-enforcing-arbitration-awards/3rd-edition/article/substantive-grounds-challenge (citing NIGEL BLACKABY ET AL., REDFERN AND HUNTER ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 569, 591 (6th ed. 2015)).17 

As a result, an alternative position holds that parties should not be allowed to waive judicial review in its entirety, but only to a limited extent that preserves a minimum level of scrutiny.18Bermann, supra note 48, at ¶ 615 (“Under that view, a legal system is entitled to make its acceptance of arbitration as an alternative to litigation contingent on the subjection of awards to at least a modicum of judicial review.”).18  This position is further reinforced, according to scholars, by the analytical commentary on the draft text of the UNCITRAL Model Law, which recognize the parties’ ability to delineate the arbitral procedure so long as it does not derogate from mandatory provisions.19See U.N. Secretary-General, Analytical Commentary on Draft Text of a Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration: Report of the Secretary-General, ¶ 45, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/264 (1985); cf. Menalco J. Solis, Removing Awards to the Autonomous Arbitral System by Waiving the Annulment Recourse, 29 Am. Rev. Int’l Arb. 127, 121-46 (2018) (discussing the mandatory and exclusive nature of annulment as the sole recourse under the Model Law).19  This interpretation suggests that the drafters of the Model Law did not conceive the annulment remedy as mandatory in nature, a conclusion reflected in the permissive wording of Article 34, which does not indicate that recourse against an award is non-waivable.20Id.20  Accordingly, provided that the Model Law’s core mandatory safeguards—most notably equality of arms and the parties’ full opportunity to present their case—are respected, an agreement to waive the annulment remedy should be regarded as valid.21Id.21

This solution seeks to strike a balance between respecting party autonomy and maintaining the legitimacy of arbitration as an adjudicatory mechanism.  The concern is that, if the judiciary is compelled by agreement of the parties to recognize and enforce awards obtained through unjust means such as corruption, partiality, or gross procedural unfairness, the integrity of the court system is undermined.22Thomas S. Meriwether, Comment: Limiting Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards Under the Federal Arbitration Act: Striking the Right Balance, 44 Hous. L. Rev. 739, 765-66 (2007).22  Thus, while legal systems have a legitimate interest in preserving parties’ rights to access arbitration as a form of alternative dispute resolution to the judiciary, they also hold an interest in preserving the “basic legitimacy and regularity of the arbitral process,” especially in the context of enforcement proceedings, since their courts are expected to give full force and effect to arbitral awards.23Bermann, supra note 48, at ¶ 616.23  Ultimately, a balanced approach to the contractual waiver of judicial review may be achieved by taking into account the interests of the annulment or enforcement state, particularly where post-award review serves to safeguard public policy or other non-derogable concerns.

B.  The Case for Expanding Judicial Review

The expansion of judicial review raises a related, yet distinct, question as to whether parties should be permitted to contractually modify the scope of judicial scrutiny over arbitral awards.24Born, supra note 1, at § 25.07[B][1] (“Parties sometimes enter into agreements providing for more extensive, rather than less extensive or no, judicial review of awards.”).24  This debate mirrors many of the concerns discussed in the context of narrowing judicial review.  At a first level, it questions whether principles of party autonomy provide a sufficient basis for giving effect to agreements that subject arbitral awards to a broader review, including a review on the merits.25Wolff, supra note 38, at 626-27.25  At a second level, it raises the issue of whether parties may validly agree to treat an arbitral award as a first instance judgment, notwithstanding the legal design of the lex arbitri governing the conditions under which an award becomes final and binding.26Id.26

The most immediate reason why parties may seek to expand judicial review lies in their concerns about the fallibility of arbitrators and their desire for additional procedural rights to correct mistaken awards.27Born, supra note 1, at § 25.07[A][1].27  Nonetheless, contractual arrangements providing for expanded judicial review have traditionally been regarded with skepticism and serious doubts exist as to their enforceability.28Id. (“They do so (albeit rarely) because of concerns about the fallibility of arbitrators and the desire for additional procedural rights to correct mistaken awards.  Nonetheless, in many countries, agreements for heightened judicial review are regarded with disfavor and serious doubts exist as to their enforceability.”)28 

To begin with, expanding judicial review of arbitral awards inevitably complicates the arbitral process by sacrificing efficiency and increasing costs, without necessarily leading to higher-quality decisions.29Meera Rajah, Ariadne’s Thread: Assessing Public Policy Limits to Contractually Modifying the Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards, 31 Am. Rev. Int’l Arb. 195 (2020).29  In practice, arbitral tribunals already tend to issue lengthy and detailed decisions addressing both facts and law, which can in turn complicate judicial review by requiring courts to engage with extensive reasoning at the post-award stage.30Id.30  Moreover, expanded review weakens and endangers the certainty and predictability of such stage.31Id.31  These are two core features that have traditionally contributed to the popularity of arbitration and are central goals of the New York Convention and modern national arbitration statutes.32Curtin, supra note 34, at 366.32 

From a normative point of view, the expansion of judicial review runs counter to the underlying rationale of the UNCITRAL Model Law’s approach, i.e., the idea that the arbitral tribunal decides in place of the state court and does not merely constitute a first instance.33U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, UNCITRAL: 2012 Digest of Case Law on the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 134, U.N. Sales No. E.12.V.9 (2012) [hereinafter UNCITRAL Digest].33  In other words, the criticism against allowing such expansion is that the scope of judicial review, as an issue of subject matter adjudicatory authority, is determined by the legislature rather than by contractual arrangements.34Smit, supra note 51, at 1000 (“In both my prior and subsequent publications I have defended the view that the scope of judicial review prescribed by law raises an issue of subject matter adjudicatory authority, which, under established principles, cannot be modified by contractual arrangements.”).34

This reflects the same objection raised against narrowing or eliminating judicial review, namely that judicial review is not merely a procedural safeguard, but a matter of public authority defined by statute.35See infra Part II.A.35  Scholars argue that courts would be acting beyond their legislatively conferred powers if the grounds for judicial review were intended to be mandatory and exclusive.  In that case, because courts may act only within the scope of authority granted to them by statute, it follows that they would lack jurisdiction to engage in a more expansive form of review.36Rajah, supra note 64, at 192.36 

This resistance finds further support in a widely discussed and influential decision of the U.S. Supreme Court: Hall Street Associates, LLC v. Mattel, Inc.37Hall Street Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 586 (2008).37  In its ruling, the Court ultimately rejected the validity of an agreement expanding the ground for judicial review of an award, on the basis that federal jurisdiction cannot be created by contract.38Id.38  The Court further considered that the role of the federal courts cannot be subverted to serve the private interest at the whim of the contracting parties.39Id.39  This reasoning rests on the premise that expanding legislatively defined judicial authority through contract is incompatible with the basic structure of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), which permits the substitution of private for public adjudication only within the limits expressly established by Congress.40Hans Smit, Hall Street Associates v. Mattel: A Critical Comment, 17 Am. Rev. Int’l Arb. 513, 514 (2006) (“In other words, definition of the proper scope of judicial subject matter authority raises a political question to be decided by the legislature, not by private parties.  Second, expanding legislatively defined subject matter authority by private agreement is incompatible with the basic thrust of the Federal Arbitration Act, which permits substitution of private for public adjudication only in the circumstances legislatively defined.”).40 

These objections, however, do not exhaust the debate.  Notwithstanding the Hall Street outcome, proponents of the contractual expansion of judicial review argue that such agreements are not contrary to public policy, as they do not diminish, but rather enhance, the level of judicial protection available to the parties.41Born, supra note 1, at § 25.07[A][1] (“This accords with principles of party autonomy, and does not detract from (but enhances) the parties’“judicial” protections.  The only basis in policy for objecting to such agreements would be that private litigants should not be permitted to define contractually the appellate review functions of a national court.  Although there is some force to this concern, it is at best tenuously implicated where parties simply contract for the generally-applicable level of appellate review provided by the relevant national courts in appeals from first instance judicial decisions.”).41  Accordingly, it has been suggested that, given the fundamental role of party autonomy in the arbitral process, statutory mechanisms governing judicial review may—absent an express legislative prohibition—be interpreted as permitting agreements that provide for heightened judicial review.42Id. (“Nor is there substantial force to the notion that statutory grounds for vacatur should, because they are ordinarily mandatory, not be subject to modification by contract, as the Hall Street Court reasoned.  The fact that the FAA provides an exclusive list of statutory grounds of judicial review of an award does not speak—even indirectly—to the question whether parties should be permitted validly to contract for heightened (or reduced) judicial review”.).42 

In fact, other courts in the U.S. have upheld the validity of a contractual expansion under the FAA by maintaining that its provisions establish a set of baseline procedural rules, instead of rigidly defining the limits of judicial jurisdiction.43Ha, supra note 5, at 9.43  The underlying idea is that the FAA, as lex arbitri, does not follow a federal policy of favoring arbitration under only a certain set of procedural rules; rather, the federal policy should be understood as simply ensuring the enforceability of private agreements to arbitrate in full accordance with its terms.44Id. (citing Gateway Techs., Inc. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 64 F.3d 993, 997 (5th Cir. 1995)); Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 468–69 (1989); Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 933 (10th Cir. 2001).44

A similar logic has been articulated with reference to the New York Convention.  As Gary Born has observed, the enforcement of contractual expansion of review “[i]s arguably required by Article II of the New York Convention, on the basis that such agreements are material terms of the parties’ agreement to arbitrate.”45Born, supra note 1, at § 25.07[A][1].45  In his view, agreements providing for heightened judicial review should, in principle, be given effect, so long as they do not impose undue or inappropriate obligations on national courts.46Id.46 

Beyond statutory and jurisdictional arguments, some commentators have provided an alternative conceptual basis for the validity of these agreements, by placing them in between arbitration and conciliation as a dispute resolution mechanism.47Wolff, supra note 38, at 632.47  Under this approach, while the award is presumed to be final when rendered, the parties retain an ex-post discretion to depart from that outcome.48Id.48  Consequently, an agreement for expanded review allows the parties, through recourse to state courts, to ultimately accept or reject the arbitral tribunal’s proposed resolution embodied in the award.49Id.49

Ultimately, international arbitration aspires to an increased promotion of the finality of awards.50Id.50  Too much court intervention may threaten arbitral autonomy and legal stability of arbitral awards in terms of the double burden imposed on the process of resolution, one in the arbitration stage and the other on the judicial stage.51Ha, supra note 5, at 5.51  That is why contractual expansion of judicial review should be approached with caution, as it risks undermining the very features of arbitration that parties typically seek to preserve.

A Calibrated Framework for Contractual Modification of Judicial Review

As discussed above, the origin of any arbitration is the parties’ freedom to contract and draft their own resolution mechanisms.1Lal & Casey, supra note 3, at 291.1  Party autonomy is often understood as the parties’ power to validly waive a legal right so long it does not offend public policy or an overarching public interest.2Solis, supra note 54, at 128.2  This understanding is also applicable here.

That is, following this logic, a moderated position holds that parties should, in principle, be permitted to waive those grounds that primarily protect their own procedural interests and safeguards, provided that such waiver does not run counter to public policy.3Franco Ferrari & Friedrich Jakob Rosenfeld, Limitations to Party Autonomy in International Arbitration, in Cambridge Compendium of International Commercial and Investment Arbitration § 3.2.2.2 (Stefan M. Kröll et al. eds., 2023).3  Similarly, the expansion of review may adopt an intermediary form by allowing a party dissatisfied with the award to seek recourse before state courts under narrowly defined conditions,4Id.4 such as the existence of a grave error of law.

Section A focuses on those grounds for annulment or refusal of enforcement that are more closely associated with public or sovereign interests and are therefore more likely to be treated as non-waivable.  Section B, in turn, considers the limited circumstances in which parties may seek to expand judicial review by agreement, examining how such expansion has been conceived in order to remain narrowly confined and to avoid transforming post-award control into a judicial appeal on the merits.

A.  Non-Modifiable Grounds: Structural and Sovereign Limits to Party Autonomy

Not all grounds are of the same nature.  While some relate to internal aspects of the arbitral process subject to party disposition, others implicate broader public or sovereign interests that cannot or must not be contractually displaced.5U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Explanatory Note by the UNCITRAL Secretariat on the 1985 Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration as Amended in 2006, in UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 23, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/982 (2012), ¶46 (“The grounds provided in article 34 (2) are set out in two categories.  Grounds which are to be proven by one party are as follows: . . . Grounds that a court may consider of its own initiative are as follows: non-arbitrability of the subject-matter of the dispute or violation of public policy (which is to be understood as serious departures from fundamental notions of procedural justice).”).5  Put differently, where parties waive the right to challenge an award as a validating mechanism, such waiver does not necessarily offend the public interest when it concerns the parties’ own interest in post-award scrutiny of procedural aspects that they were otherwise free to design.6Solis, supra note 54, at 129.6  Thus, a moderated approach to limiting judicial review rests on the premise that parties may agree to exclude recourse against an arbitral award, provided that such agreement does not conflict with mandatory provisions of the law or with public policy.7UNCITRAL Digest, supra note 68, at 135.7

Under this approach, the category of review grounds provided in paragraph 2 of both Article V of the New York Convention and Article 34 of the UNCITRAL Model Law8Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards art. V, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3; see also UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, supra note 21, art. 34.8—namely, non-arbitrability of the subject matter and violations of public policy—may be regarded as unwaivable expressions of public interest for these purposes.9Ferrari & Rosenfeld, supra note 89, at § 3.3 (“From a normative perspective, this is supported by the fact that certain grounds for denying recognition and enforcement are examined by state courts without corresponding submissions by the parties under Article V(2) of the New York Convention.”).9  This is not to suggest that these grounds exhaust all possible non-waivable limits, or that debate may not arise as to whether other grounds—such as the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement—should likewise be treated as reflecting public interests.  Rather, these two grounds at least occupy a distinctive position, insofar as they must be examined ex officio by the reviewing court and do not depend on proof or invocation by the parties.10Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, supra note 94; UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, supra note 21.10  For that reason, they may be understood as the most elementary expressions of public policy constraints on party autonomy.  This section therefore examines the rationale for treating these two grounds as mandatory limits to party autonomy, regardless of whether they arise in the context of annulment or enforcement proceedings.

The first of these, arbitrability, refers to the limits that a legal system imposes on the types of disputes that may be resolved by arbitration.11David Quinke, New York Convention, Article V(2)(a) [Objective Arbitrability], in New York Convention: Article-by-Article Commentary 351 (Reinmar Wolff ed., 2d ed. 2019), ¶ 419-21.11  Although the term is sometimes used more broadly to include issues of jurisdiction or the validity of the arbitration agreement, its prevailing international understanding is narrower: arbitrability concerns whether a given subject matter may be submitted to arbitration at all.12Id.12  In other words, it defines the categories of disputes that are removed from the parties’ disposition and reserved for resolution exclusively by national courts.13Ferrari & Rosenfeld, supra note 89, at § 3.3.2 (“There are various fields in which most legislators have reserved for the judicial power a monopoly of the administration of justice in the public interest.”).13

Although this ground is not frequently invoked in practice,14Penny Madden & Ceyda Knoebel, Arbitrability and Public Policy Challenges, in The Guide to Challenging and Enforcing Arbitration Awards (4th ed. 2025).14 the arbitrability doctrine serves as a “safety valve” as it allows states to retain exclusive authority over the question of whether certain subject matters—especially those involving public interests—may be submitted to arbitration.15Quinke, supra note 97, at ¶ 419-421.15  Accordingly, both the enforcement and the seat forum states have a legitimate interest in preserving this prerogative, as it ensures that courts retain the ability to confirm whether such matters are indeed appropriate for resolution through arbitration if, for instance, they do not involve the rights of specific individuals that require additional protection by the state or account for wider public interest.16Madden & Knoebel, supra note 100.16 

By contrast, the public policy ground serves as a final line of defense that allows states to reject arbitral awards that are fundamentally incompatible with their legal order.17Id. (“Moreover, given that ‘public policy’ is understood to encompass these most fundamental norms from which no court can depart, it also goes beyond the ‘mandatory laws’ concept.”).17  That is, public policy has been recognized as essentially relating to “the forum State’s basic notions of morality and justice.”18Albert Jan van den Berg, Should the Setting Aside of the Arbitral Award Be Abolished?, ICSID Rev. 1, 6 (2014).18  It derives from the basic principle that no court should lend its authority to enforce or uphold an award grounded in an immoral or illegal act, and is further justified by the idea that the public’s interest in limiting the scope of private agreements would be overlooked unless courts take such interests into account when determining the award’s enforceability or validity.19Ann C. Hodges, Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards on Public Policy Grounds: Lessons from the Case Law, 15 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 91, 101 (2000).19  As such, the public policy exception functions as a safeguard that allows states to prevent the intrusion or recognition of awards they consider irreconcilable with their domestic legal system.20Petra Butler & Christoph Katerndahl, Kastom: A Public Policy Exception Under the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 7 Indian J. Arb. L. 104, 108 (2018).20 

This exception thus reflects a balance between two competing concerns: the broader policy favoring arbitration and the effective enforcement of arbitral awards, and the need to prevent abuse of process or abuse of principle.21Margaret L. Moses, Public Policy Under the New York Convention: National, International, and Transnational, in 60 Years of the New York Convention: Key Issues and Future Challenges 169, 171 (Katia Fach Gómez & Ana M. López-Rodríguez eds., 2019).21  It is also understood as a compromise between honoring party autonomy and safeguarding the state’s interest in protecting its most fundamental principles,22Id.22 a burden that rests with the courts as they are ultimately responsible for ensuring that public policy is effectively upheld.23Hodges, supra note 105, at 112.23 

Notably, while due process is expressly addressed by a specific provision of the New York Convention, it is generally accepted that due process considerations may also fall within the public policy exception set out in Article V(2)(b).24Bernard Hanotiau & Olivier Caprasse, Arbitrability, Due Process, and Public Policy Under Article V of the New York Convention, 25 J. Int’l Arb. 721, 727 (2008).24  Case law shows that courts recognize violations of due process only in particularly serious circumstances, as a breach of domestic notions of due process under foreign law does not necessarily amount to a violation of the forum’s own due process standards.25Id. at 728 (“The U.S. courts have clarified the due process requirement in arbitration in a way that could perfectly reflect the due process requirements under Belgian and French law.  They have made it clear that: ‘an arbitral award should be denied or vacated if the party challenging the award proves that he was not given a meaningful opportunity to be heard . . . It is clear that an arbitrator must provide a fundamentally fair hearing.’”).25  In many civil law jurisdictions, for instance, due process guarantees are understood as forming part of public policy, yet are applied in a restrained manner at the enforcement stage.26Id. at 730.26 

Given the fundamental nature of public policy, its scope is traditionally construed narrowly.27Id.27  A widely accepted view is that the public policy exception should not operate as a vehicle to “implement all the interests of the public at large.”28Ferrari & Rosenfeld, supra note 89, at § 3.3.3.28  Rather, its function is to ensure that the dispositive portion of an arbitral award does not require conduct that is prohibited or fundamentally incompatible with the legal order of the forum.29Id.29 

These characteristics of public policy have direct implications for the limits of party autonomy in the context of judicial review.  That is, public policy reflects fundamental moral or legal principles that cannot be derogated from by contract.30Moses, supra note 107, at 179 ( “Fundamental moral or legal principles recognized in all civilized countries [. . .] are considered transnational public policy.  These are basic to every fair and decent society and fundamental principles that cannot be derogated from by contract.”).30  By the same logic, parties should not be able to, through agreement, prevent courts from upholding those principles by eliminating judicial review, as it is the very mechanism through which courts ensure that arbitral awards do not conflict with public interests.31Ferrari & Rosenfeld, supra note 89, at § 3.3.3 (“The conclusion to be drawn is hence that public policy imposes a limitation to party autonomy in the interest of the public at large.”).31

This reasoning was even adopted in the Canadian case Noble China Inc v. Lei, where the court considered whether the parties could exclude grounds for setting aside an award under Article 34 of the UNCITRAL Model Law.32Daniella Strik, Growing Number of Countries Allowing Exclusion Agreements with Respect to Annulment Warrants Greater Scrutiny of Arbitration Clauses, Kluwer Arb. Blog (Jan. 11, 2012),  https://legalblogs.wolterskluwer.com/arbitration-blog/growing-number-of-countries-allowing-exclusion-agreements-with-respect-to-annulment-warrants-greater-scrutiny-of-arbitration-clauses.32  The Ontario Court recognized that parties may in principle waive certain review grounds, but made clear that such an agreement could not conflict with mandatory provisions or with public policy.33Id.33  Similarly, a New Zealand court acknowledged the availability of contractual agreements that limit the scope of review—suggesting that such provisions might be seen as complementing, rather than overriding, Article 34.34UNCITRAL Digest, supra note 68, at 135.34  Nevertheless, it held that the right to seek review for violations of the rules of natural justice could not be waived,35Id.35 reinforcing the view that certain procedural guarantees must remain outside the scope of party autonomy.

Thus, while party autonomy remains a foundational principle of international arbitration, it cannot override the state’s sovereign interest in ensuring that arbitral proceedings and their outcomes remain within the bounds of arbitrability and public policy.  Their non-waivable nature reflects the limited but crucial role that state courts continue to play in preserving the boundaries of the arbitral process and ensuring its alignment with fundamental legal and moral principles—protected interests that remain permanently beyond the reach of party agreement.

B.  Contractual Expansion Without Turning Judicial Review into an Appeal

Likewise, the possibility of contractually expanding judicial review arises from the same premise of party autonomy, yet engages a different set of structural concerns than those implicated by the waiver or restriction of review grounds.36See infra Part II.B.36  As discussed above, any attempt to expand judicial review must be approached with particular caution.  Excessive court intervention risks diminishing some of the arbitration’s defining features—most notably procedural efficiency, finality, and the parties’ decision to remove their dispute from the ordinary jurisdiction of national courts.  At the same time, an outright rejection of any form of expanded review may sit uneasily with party autonomy in circumstances where the arbitral process produces a decision perceived as seriously deficient and where limited judicial scrutiny could serve as a corrective mechanism of last resort.

To address these concerns, England’s system of court intervention over awards provide for a moderate approach to contractual judicial expansion.  While England preserves a tradition of strong judicial supervision over arbitral proceedings, it simultaneously seeks to maintain a pro-arbitration framework that enhances its attractiveness as a seat.37Wolff, supra note 38, at 637 (“The driving force behind this development towards an increased finality of awards was to maintain the attractiveness of London as a venue for international arbitration.”).37  Still, English law provides a default right for parties to appeal to the High Court on a question of English law arising from an arbitral award.38Id.38 

Section 69 of the English Arbitration Act expressly provides the following: “[u]nless otherwise agreed by the parties, a party to arbitral proceedings may (upon notice to the other parties and to the tribunal) appeal to the court on a question of law arising out of an award made in the proceedings.”39Arbitration Act 1996, c. 23, § 69 (U.K.).39  This provision reflects a comparatively more extensive form of judicial review than that available in many other jurisdictions, as it permits appeals on questions of law while preserving party autonomy by allowing the parties to opt out by agreement.40Michael Dunmore, Chapter III: The Award and the Courts, The Seat: Its Influence on Proceedings and Enforcement, in Austrian Yearbook on International Arbitration 2015 373 (Christian Klausegger et al. eds., 2015).40 

The wording of Section 69 reflects a conscious effort to limit court intervention, notwithstanding its more interventionist appearance at first glance.  Earlier versions of the provision required arbitrators to state a case to the High Court for guidance on questions of law in a broad range of circumstances, and did not allow parties to exclude such recourse by agreement.41Adam Samuel, The 1979 Arbitration Act—Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards on the Merits in England, 2 J. Int’l Arb. 53, 54 (1985).41  By contrast, the current right of appeal is subject to leave of the court and is narrowly confined to situations in which the tribunal’s decision on a question of law is “obviously wrong,” the question is one of “general public importance,” or the decision “is at least open to serious doubt,” so that it would be “just and proper in all the circumstances for the court to determine the question.”42Nigel Blackaby, Constantine Partasides & Alan Redfern, Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration ¶ 10.71 (7th ed. 2023).42 

What is notable about this approach is that, while it could be perceived as allowing heightened judicial scrutiny, practice indicates that Section 69 has not undermined the finality of arbitral awards, except in a narrow and clearly circumscribed set of cases.43Kate Davies, In Defence of Section 69 of the English Arbitration Act, Kluwer Arb. Blog (Nov. 1, 2010), https://legalblogs.wolterskluwer.com/arbitration-blog/in-defence-of-section-69-of-the-english-arbitration-act.43  As skepticism toward judicial review persists, parties frequently elect to contract out of Section 69.44Id.44  Indeed, the LCIA Rules have been interpreted to operate on the basis that parties are deemed to have excluded Section 69 by default, and that review on questions of law applies only where the parties have expressly agreed to a form of review, appeal, or recourse.45Id.45  It has been suggested that, by providing for a right of appeal only with the consent of all parties and the leave of the Court, the Act proceeds on the assumption that, as a general matter, parties do not contemplate appellate review of arbitral awards.46Samuel, supra note 127, at 74.46 

Ultimately, this approach under English law reflects a broader reliance on freedom of contract when determining the availability of appellate review of arbitral awards.  As one commentator observed, “[t]he cornerstone of the argument for an appeal system for arbitration awards limited to cases where the parties have expressly agreed to it, is the doctrine of freedom of contract (pacta sunt servanda) on which the law of international trade is so heavily reliant.”47Id.47  English law thus validates arbitration agreements as it does other contractual arrangements, giving their terms their ordinary meaning in light of their commercial purpose and factual background.48Id.48  In this sense, the appeal of the English model lies in allowing the parties to decide whether their arbitral award will be subject to a limited and clearly circumscribed form of judicial review on questions of law.

Allowing Waiver or Expansion of Grounds: Practical Success or False Promise?

While there is no certainty that moderated systems allowing for the contractual modification are, in practice, capable of addressing the concerns illustrated by the cases discussed in Part I, they nonetheless offer a more responsive alternative to excessively rigid models of post-award review.  Rather than treating judicial intervention as an all-or-nothing proposition, these approaches seek to recalibrate the balance between finality and correction in a more flexible manner.  Significantly, some jurisdictions have already embraced variants of this approach by permitting parties to expand or limit judicial review by agreement.  The experience of these jurisdictions thus provides a point of reference to assess whether such mechanisms may, at least to some extent, alleviate the growing unease surrounding the perceived rigidity or inadequacy of post-award review in international arbitration.

Consequently, within the context of contractually moderated judicial review, Section A examines Croatia v.  MOL Hungarian Oil and Gas Company PLC (“Croatia v.  MOL”), a case in which the Swiss Federal Supreme Court dismissed an attempt to challenge the award precisely because the parties had contractually renounced recourse against it.  Section B, by contrast, turns to Sharp Corp Ltd v. Viterra BV (“Sharp v. Viterra”), a more recent decision of the English Supreme Court in which the Court, relying on Section 69 of the Arbitration Act, undertook a review of the arbitral tribunal’s reasoning to assess whether it had correctly resolved the question of law submitted to it.

A.  Croatia v. MOL

The first case addressing the validation and enforcement of a contractual waiver of judicial review concerns a dispute between Hungary’s largest oil company and the Republic of Croatia arising out of the acquisition of a controlling interest in Croatia’s own largest oil company.1Stephan Wilske, Todd J. Fox & RafaÅ‚ Kos, What’s New in European Arbitration?, 72 Disp. Resol. J. 79, 84 (2017).1  Under a master agreement and a shareholders’ agreement, MOL was granted extensive management control rights.2Id.2   Several years later, Croatia sought to annul both agreements on the basis of alleged bribery and initiated arbitration against MOL under the UNCITRAL Rules.4Id.4  In December 2016, the arbitral tribunal dismissed Croatia’s claims in their entirety, finding that the evidence was insufficient to substantiate the allegations.5Id.5

Croatia subsequently sought to challenge the award before the Swiss Federal Supreme Court, arguing that the arbitral tribunal had not been properly constituted and raising concerns regarding the independence and impartiality of its party-appointed arbitrator.6Id. at 85.6  MOL objected to Croatia’s annulment application on admissibility grounds, invoking the contractual waiver of recourse against the arbitral award contained in the dispute resolution clauses of the relevant agreements.7Courtney Furner, Vasiliki Dritsa & Vera Bykova, Jurisprudence of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court in Setting Aside and Revision Proceedings Involving Investment Arbitration Awards (2020 to 2022): Strengthening Switzerland as a Pro-Arbitration Jurisdiction, in The Future of Swiss Arbitration ¶¶ 23–26 (Johannes R. W. et al. eds., 2023).7  The waiver provided that: “Awards rendered in any arbitration hereunder shall be final and conclusive and judgment thereon may be entered into any court having jurisdiction for enforcement thereof.  There shall be no appeal to any court from awards rendered hereunder.”8Id.8 

The Swiss Supreme Court interpreted the broadly worded waiver clause as excluding all forms of recourse against the arbitral award, holding that the parties’ explicit waiver of any appeal necessarily encompassed the revision sought by Croatia.9Republic of Croatia v. MOL Hungarian Oil & Gas Co., Tribunal fédéral [TF] Oct. 17, 2017, 4A_53/2017, ¶¶ 2.2–2.3 (Switz.).9  The Court found that the waiver was valid under Article 192(1) of the Swiss Private International Law Act (PILA).10Id.10  In its view, the appeal was inadmissible because it disregarded the parties’ common intention—expressly declared—not to submit arbitral awards to review by the state courts of the seat of the arbitration.11Id.11  That common intention was not limited to any particular ground listed in Article 190(2) PILA, but extended to all such grounds, including those relating to the alleged irregular constitution of the arbitral tribunal.12Id.12

The Supreme Court concluded Croatia’s petition could not be examined on the merits and dismissed it.13Id.13  Ultimately, the Court gave precedence to party autonomy, reasoning that a restrictive interpretation of the waiver—one that excluded recourse against the award—would deprive the contractual possibility of waiving annulment proceedings of any practical effect, thereby violating the principle of good faith.14Wilske et al., supra note 135, at 86.14 

Taken together, the Court’s reasoning and outcome illustrate the type of balance that may be achieved under a moderated system of judicial review.  Such a system permits the waiver of certain annulment grounds on the basis of party autonomy and contractual freedom, while remaining anchored in a clear statutory framework.  The particular circumstances of this case—namely, the nature of the ground invoked (the constitution, independence, and impartiality of the arbitral tribunal), the presence of an unequivocal waiver clause, and the jurisdiction’s openness to allowing parties to shape the contours of their arbitral process—provide a context in which contractual narrowing of judicial review may not only be permissible and enforceable, but also desirable.

B.  Sharp v. Viterra

The second case of interest arose out of two international commodity sale contracts concluded under C&FFO Mundra (India) terms, which contemplated delivery and unloading of agricultural goods at the port of Mundra, India, with payment due prior to arrival.15Sharp Corp. v. Viterra B.V., [2024] UKSC 14, ¶¶ 4–38 (U.K.) (May 8, 2024).15  The buyers failed to make timely payment, and although the parties agreed to extend the payment deadline, the buyers remained in default.16Id.16  Following the imposition of import tariffs by the Indian authorities, the sellers declared the buyers in default, obtained possession of the goods, and subsequently resold them to a third party.17Id.17  Arbitration was thus commenced under the relevant GAFTA contracts.18Id.18

In its award, the GAFTA Appeal Board found that the buyers were in default and liable for damages under the GAFTA Default Clause, assessed on the basis of the market value of the goods at the relevant time.19Id.19  The buyers subsequently appealed the award to the English courts under Section 69 of the Arbitration Act 1996; leave to appeal was granted in respect of questions concerning the proper assessment of damages and the determination of the goods’ value.20Claire Messer & Lucy Wickham, The GAFTA Default Clause and the Scope of Arbitration Appeals, Kluwer Arb. Blog (Aug. 13, 2024), https://legalblogs.wolterskluwer.com/arbitration-blog/the-gafta-default-clause-and-the-scope-of-arbitration-appeals.20  The case proceeded to the Court of Appeal, which reformulated the question of law, and permission was thereafter granted to appeal to the Supreme Court.21Id.21  The Supreme Court ultimately clarified the scope of the question of law before it and held that the Court of Appeal had erred by deciding a legal issue that the arbitral tribunal had not been asked to determine, and by making findings of fact on matters on which the arbitral tribunal had made no findings.22Id.22 

This decision illustrates the practical implications of Section 69 as a calibrated mechanism for judicial intervention, one that seeks to accommodate party autonomy without eliminating the defining attributes of arbitration.  Sharp v. Viterra demonstrates how English law allows parties to opt into a limited form of post-award review while simultaneously imposing clear and enforceable boundaries on the scope of that review. 

In particular, the Supreme Court’s reasoning reinforces a disciplined focus on what constitutes an admissible question of law and confirms that courts must resist the temptation to revisit factual determinations or to decide issues not addressed by the arbitral tribunal itself.  By correcting the Court of Appeal’s overreach and reaffirming these limits, the decision evidences a deliberate exercise of judicial self-restraint.  In doing so, it underscores the reliability of a system that permits contractual expansion of judicial review in exceptional circumstances, yet remains firmly committed to preserving arbitral finality, procedural efficiency, and the proper allocation of decision-making authority between arbitral tribunals and national courts.

Conclusion

Dissatisfaction with judicial review in international arbitration may arise from opposite, yet equally problematic, directions.  On the one hand, excessively restrained review mechanisms may leave parties without any meaningful avenue to address serious arbitral deficiencies, thereby undermining confidence in the arbitral process ex post.  On the other hand, overly expansive judicial intervention risks transforming post-award control into a de facto appeal, deteriorating the finality and efficiency that motivate parties to arbitrate in the first place.  The Chilean and Indian cases examined in this article illustrate how both extremes may put at risk the legitimacy of arbitration, highlighting the need to reassess whether the prevailing default model of judicial review is sufficiently responsive to the realities of contemporary arbitral practice.

Against this backdrop, party autonomy emerges as both a source of flexibility and a point of friction.  While it provides a compelling foundation for allowing parties to modify the scope of judicial review, it cannot operate in isolation from the functions that judicial review performs under current statutory, institutional and international frameworks.  Such functions extend beyond the protection of individual party interests, and include the preservation of public policy, arbitrability, and the legitimacy of adjudication itself.  Any contractual modification of review must therefore keep in mind these structural limits, distinguishing between safeguards that are properly within the parties’ disposition and those that remain non-derogable public concerns.

The experience of jurisdictions that have permitted calibrated forms of contractual waiver or expansion of judicial review suggests that this balance is not only conceptually defensible, but practically achievable.  Moderated systems—whether through enforceable waivers of certain review grounds or narrowly circumscribed appeals on questions of law—demonstrate that flexibility need not collapse into appellate review, nor must finality require absolute absence of judicial control.  When carefully designed and applied with judicial restraint, such mechanisms offer a nuanced alternative to rigid models of review, one that preserves the core attributes of arbitration while allowing parties, in exceptional circumstances, to tailor post-award scrutiny to their specific needs.

Endnotes

1Gary Born, Legal Framework for International Arbitration Agreements, in INT’L COM. ARB. § 2.01 (3d. ed. 2021) (citing Dell Computer Corp. v. Union des Consommateurs, [2007] SCC 34, ¶ 51 (Can.)).
2Id. § 2.02[C][4].
3Hamish Lal & Brendan Casey, “Arbitral Innovation” or “Tribunal Overreach”: A Call for Renewed Focus on Party Autonomy in the Time of Arbitral Rules Expansion, 31 Am. Rev. Int’l Arb. 291, 291 (2020).
4Michael Wietzorek, Agreements on an Expanded Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards, in 2014 Austrian Y.B. Int’l Arb. 343 (Christian Klausegger et al. eds., 2014).
5Choong-Lyong Ha, The Finality of Arbitral Awards: The U.S. Practices, 30 J. Arb. Stud. 3, 5 (2020).
6Joyvio Grp. Co. v. Quiroga Moreno, CAM Santiago Case No. A-5.484-2023, Award (May 22, 2025).
7José Joaquín Ugarte, Award Rendered in Multimillionaire Chilean Salmon Saga: Hot Topics and Set-Aside Key Aspects, Kluwer Arb. Blog (Nov. 19, 2025), https://legalblogs.wolterskluwer.com/arbitration-blog/award-rendered-in-multimillionaire-chilean-salmon-saga-hot-topics-and-set-aside-key-aspects.
8Id.
9Joyvio, supra note 6; see also Caroline Simson, Chinese Co. Looks to Enforce $217M Salmon Farming Award, Law360 (Aug. 19, 2025), https://www.law360.com/articles/2378318/chinese-co-looks-to-enforce-217m-salmon-farming-award.
10Jack Ballantyne, Chilean Salmon Award Reaches U.S. Courts, Glob. Arb. Rev. (Aug. 19, 2025), https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/chilean-salmon-award-reaches-us-courts.
11Id.; see also Joyvio, supra note 6.
12Christian Molinari, Quiroga Family Defense Calls for Award in Australis Case to Be Annulled, SeafoodSource (Oct. 8, 2025), https://www.seafoodsource.com/news/supply-trade/quiroga-family-defense-calls-for-award-in-australis-case-to-be-annulled.
13Id.
14Ugarte, supra note 7.
15Ballantyne, supra note 10.
16Id.
17Id.
18Ugarte, supra note 7.
19Petición de nulidad de laudo arbitral, Asesorías e Inversiones Benjamín S.A. et al. v. Food Investment SpA et al., Corte de Apelaciones de Santiago (filed Aug. 2025) (Chile).
20On June 24, 2026, the Santiago Court of Appeals granted the annulment petition, marking the first annulment of an international arbitral award in Chile. The Court held that the award exceeded the scope of the arbitration agreement under Article 34(2)(a)(iii) of Law No. 19,971 (LACI) because it granted relief based on a different cause of action than the one pleaded and litigated by the parties. Having found this specific ground for annulment established, the Court declined to uphold the remaining grounds invoked, including the public policy challenge. Joyvio Grp. Co. v. Quiroga Moreno, No. Civil-17067-2025, Judgment of the Santiago Court of Appeals (June 24, 2026).
21UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, art. 34, U.N. Doc. A/40/17, annex I (1985), as amended in 2006, providing that: “(1) Recourse to a court against an arbitral award may be made only by an application for setting aside in accordance with paragraphs (2) and (3) of this article. (2) An arbitral award may be set aside by the court specified in article 6 only if: (a) the party making the application furnishes proof that: (ii) the party making the application was not given proper notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbitral proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case; (iii) the award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration; (b) the court finds that: (ii) the award is in conflict with the public policy of this State” (excerpted).
22Ley No. 19.971 sobre Arbitraje Comercial Internacional, art. 34, Diario Oficial [D.O.], Sept. 29, 2004 (Chile).
23Elina Mereminskaya, When “Only” Is Not Just Another Word: The Chilean Constitutional Court Upholds the Constitutionality of the Term in Article 34 of Law on International Commercial Arbitration, Kluwer Arb. Blog (Mar. 19, 2025), https://legalblogs.wolterskluwer.com/arbitration-blog/when-only-is-not-just-another-word-the-chilean-constitutional-court-upholds-the-constitutionality-of-the-term-in-article-34-of-law-on-international-commercial-arbitration.
24See Gayatri Balasamy v. ISG Novasoft Technologies Ltd., 2025 INSC 605 (India); Court’s Power to Modify an Arbitral Award, Sup. Ct. Observer, https://www.scobserver.in/cases/courts-power-to-modify-an-arbitral-award-gayatri-balasamy-v-m-s-isg-novasoft-technologies-ltd.
25Karshana Agarwal & Tanay Dubey, Arbitration’s USP at Stake? Supreme Court Settles the Debate Over Judicial Modification of Awards in India, Kluwer Arb. Blog (July 25, 2025), https://legalblogs.wolterskluwer.com/arbitration-blog/arbitrations-usp-at-stake-supreme-court-settles-the-debate-over-judicial-modification-of-awards-in-india.
26Id.
27Arbitration and Conciliation Act, No. 26 of 1996, § 34 (Aug. 16, 1996) (India).
28Modification of Awards: India’s Supreme Court Redefines Scope of Judicial Interference, Glob. Arb. Rev. (June 20, 2025), https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/modification-of-awards-indias-supreme-court-redefines-scope-of-judicial-interference.
29Id.
30Agarwal & Dubey, supra note 25.
31Id.
32Susannah Moody, Indian Supreme Court Rules on Power to Modify Awards, Glob. Arb. Rev. (May 2, 2025), https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/indian-supreme-court-rules-power-modify-awards.
33Id.
34Kenneth M. Curtin, An Examination of Contractual Expansion and Limitation of Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards, 15 Ohio St. J. On Disp. Resol. 358 (2000) (“If, after a successful arbitration, such parties still are faced with prolonged and costly award enforcement litigation in a foreign court, all the benefits of arbitration would be destroyed, especially the neutral forum so cherished by participants in international trade.”).
35Id.
36Lal & Casey, supra note 3, at 293.
37 Id. at 291.
38Nigel Blackaby et al., Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration ¶¶ 10.65–10.66 (7th ed. 2023) (“[T]he balance has come down overwhelmingly in favour of finality and against judicial review of substance, except in very limited circumstances. . . . In the middle of the scale, a large number of states have adopted (either in full or with some modifications) the limited grounds of recourse laid down in the Model Law, which mirror the grounds for refusal of enforcement under the New York Convention.”); see also Reinmar Wolff, Party Autonomy to Agree on Non Final Arbitration?, 26 ASA Bull. 626, 626–41 (2008) (“Consistently, awards can only be set aside due to fundamental formal flaws.  This limited review warrants the equivalence of an award and a state court judgment.”).
39Curtin, supra note 34, at 357.
40Id.
41Id. at 361.
42Id.
43Born, supra note 1, § 25.07[A][1] (“There is substantial force to these comments, but where sophisticated companies freely decide that they wish to forego any review in annulment proceedings, it is difficult to see why that agreement should not be given effect, save in the most extraordinary circumstances (e.g., involving post hoc fraud or similar wrongdoing).”).
44Id.
45Id. (citing Tribunal fédéral [TF] Jan. 4, 2012, 4A_238/2011, ¶ 3.2 (Switz.)).
46Id.
47Id.
48George Bermann, Party Autonomy to Vary the Standards for Annulment, in Int’l Arb. & Priv. Int’l L. 405, ¶ 615 (2017).
49Id.
50Id. (“[S]o that no adjudicatory decision purporting to apply the law should be completely immune from judicial review.”).
51Hans Smit, Contractual Modifications of the Arbitral Process, 113 Penn St. L. Rev. 1000 (2009).
52John Terry et al., Substantive Grounds for Challenge, in THE GUIDE TO CHALLENGING AND ENFORCING ARBITRATION AWARDS (3d ed.), https://globalarbitrationreview.com/guide/the-guide-challenging-and-enforcing-arbitration-awards/3rd-edition/article/substantive-grounds-challenge (citing NIGEL BLACKABY ET AL., REDFERN AND HUNTER ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 569, 591 (6th ed. 2015)).
53Bermann, supra note 48, at ¶ 615 (“Under that view, a legal system is entitled to make its acceptance of arbitration as an alternative to litigation contingent on the subjection of awards to at least a modicum of judicial review.”).
54See U.N. Secretary-General, Analytical Commentary on Draft Text of a Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration: Report of the Secretary-General, ¶ 45, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/264 (1985); cf. Menalco J. Solis, Removing Awards to the Autonomous Arbitral System by Waiving the Annulment Recourse, 29 Am. Rev. Int’l Arb. 127, 121-46 (2018) (discussing the mandatory and exclusive nature of annulment as the sole recourse under the Model Law).
55Id.
56Id.
57Thomas S. Meriwether, Comment: Limiting Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards Under the Federal Arbitration Act: Striking the Right Balance, 44 Hous. L. Rev. 739, 765-66 (2007).
58Bermann, supra note 48, at ¶ 616.
59Born, supra note 1, at § 25.07[B][1] (“Parties sometimes enter into agreements providing for more extensive, rather than less extensive or no, judicial review of awards.”).
60Wolff, supra note 38, at 626-27.
61Id.
62Born, supra note 1, at § 25.07[A][1].
63Id. (“They do so (albeit rarely) because of concerns about the fallibility of arbitrators and the desire for additional procedural rights to correct mistaken awards.  Nonetheless, in many countries, agreements for heightened judicial review are regarded with disfavor and serious doubts exist as to their enforceability.”)
64Meera Rajah, Ariadne’s Thread: Assessing Public Policy Limits to Contractually Modifying the Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards, 31 Am. Rev. Int’l Arb. 195 (2020).
65Id.
66Id.
67Curtin, supra note 34, at 366.
68U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, UNCITRAL: 2012 Digest of Case Law on the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 134, U.N. Sales No. E.12.V.9 (2012) [hereinafter UNCITRAL Digest].
69Smit, supra note 51, at 1000 (“In both my prior and subsequent publications I have defended the view that the scope of judicial review prescribed by law raises an issue of subject matter adjudicatory authority, which, under established principles, cannot be modified by contractual arrangements.”).
70See infra Part II.A.
71Rajah, supra note 64, at 192.
72Hall Street Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 586 (2008).
73Id.
74Id.
75Hans Smit, Hall Street Associates v. Mattel: A Critical Comment, 17 Am. Rev. Int’l Arb. 513, 514 (2006) (“In other words, definition of the proper scope of judicial subject matter authority raises a political question to be decided by the legislature, not by private parties.  Second, expanding legislatively defined subject matter authority by private agreement is incompatible with the basic thrust of the Federal Arbitration Act, which permits substitution of private for public adjudication only in the circumstances legislatively defined.”).
76Born, supra note 1, at § 25.07[A][1] (“This accords with principles of party autonomy, and does not detract from (but enhances) the parties’“judicial” protections.  The only basis in policy for objecting to such agreements would be that private litigants should not be permitted to define contractually the appellate review functions of a national court.  Although there is some force to this concern, it is at best tenuously implicated where parties simply contract for the generally-applicable level of appellate review provided by the relevant national courts in appeals from first instance judicial decisions.”).
77Id. (“Nor is there substantial force to the notion that statutory grounds for vacatur should, because they are ordinarily mandatory, not be subject to modification by contract, as the Hall Street Court reasoned.  The fact that the FAA provides an exclusive list of statutory grounds of judicial review of an award does not speak—even indirectly—to the question whether parties should be permitted validly to contract for heightened (or reduced) judicial review”.).
78Ha, supra note 5, at 9.
79Id. (citing Gateway Techs., Inc. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 64 F.3d 993, 997 (5th Cir. 1995)); Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 468–69 (1989); Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 933 (10th Cir. 2001).
80Born, supra note 1, at § 25.07[A][1].
81Id.
82Wolff, supra note 38, at 632.
83Id.
84Id.
85Id.
86Ha, supra note 5, at 5.
87Lal & Casey, supra note 3, at 291.
88Solis, supra note 54, at 128.
89Franco Ferrari & Friedrich Jakob Rosenfeld, Limitations to Party Autonomy in International Arbitration, in Cambridge Compendium of International Commercial and Investment Arbitration § 3.2.2.2 (Stefan M. Kröll et al. eds., 2023).
90Id.
91U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Explanatory Note by the UNCITRAL Secretariat on the 1985 Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration as Amended in 2006, in UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 23, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/982 (2012), ¶46 (“The grounds provided in article 34 (2) are set out in two categories.  Grounds which are to be proven by one party are as follows: . . . Grounds that a court may consider of its own initiative are as follows: non-arbitrability of the subject-matter of the dispute or violation of public policy (which is to be understood as serious departures from fundamental notions of procedural justice).”).
92Solis, supra note 54, at 129.
93UNCITRAL Digest, supra note 68, at 135.
94Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards art. V, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3; see also UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, supra note 21, art. 34.
95Ferrari & Rosenfeld, supra note 89, at § 3.3 (“From a normative perspective, this is supported by the fact that certain grounds for denying recognition and enforcement are examined by state courts without corresponding submissions by the parties under Article V(2) of the New York Convention.”).
96Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, supra note 94; UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, supra note 21.
97David Quinke, New York Convention, Article V(2)(a) [Objective Arbitrability], in New York Convention: Article-by-Article Commentary 351 (Reinmar Wolff ed., 2d ed. 2019), ¶ 419-21.
98Id.
99Ferrari & Rosenfeld, supra note 89, at § 3.3.2 (“There are various fields in which most legislators have reserved for the judicial power a monopoly of the administration of justice in the public interest.”).
100Penny Madden & Ceyda Knoebel, Arbitrability and Public Policy Challenges, in The Guide to Challenging and Enforcing Arbitration Awards (4th ed. 2025).
101Quinke, supra note 97, at ¶ 419-421.
102Madden & Knoebel, supra note 100.
103Id. (“Moreover, given that ‘public policy’ is understood to encompass these most fundamental norms from which no court can depart, it also goes beyond the ‘mandatory laws’ concept.”).
104Albert Jan van den Berg, Should the Setting Aside of the Arbitral Award Be Abolished?, ICSID Rev. 1, 6 (2014).
105Ann C. Hodges, Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards on Public Policy Grounds: Lessons from the Case Law, 15 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 91, 101 (2000).
106Petra Butler & Christoph Katerndahl, Kastom: A Public Policy Exception Under the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 7 Indian J. Arb. L. 104, 108 (2018).
107Margaret L. Moses, Public Policy Under the New York Convention: National, International, and Transnational, in 60 Years of the New York Convention: Key Issues and Future Challenges 169, 171 (Katia Fach Gómez & Ana M. López-Rodríguez eds., 2019).
108Id.
109Hodges, supra note 105, at 112.
110Bernard Hanotiau & Olivier Caprasse, Arbitrability, Due Process, and Public Policy Under Article V of the New York Convention, 25 J. Int’l Arb. 721, 727 (2008).
111Id. at 728 (“The U.S. courts have clarified the due process requirement in arbitration in a way that could perfectly reflect the due process requirements under Belgian and French law.  They have made it clear that: ‘an arbitral award should be denied or vacated if the party challenging the award proves that he was not given a meaningful opportunity to be heard . . . It is clear that an arbitrator must provide a fundamentally fair hearing.’”).
112Id. at 730.
113Id.
114Ferrari & Rosenfeld, supra note 89, at § 3.3.3.
115Id.
116Moses, supra note 107, at 179 ( “Fundamental moral or legal principles recognized in all civilized countries [. . .] are considered transnational public policy.  These are basic to every fair and decent society and fundamental principles that cannot be derogated from by contract.”).
117Ferrari & Rosenfeld, supra note 89, at § 3.3.3 (“The conclusion to be drawn is hence that public policy imposes a limitation to party autonomy in the interest of the public at large.”).
118Daniella Strik, Growing Number of Countries Allowing Exclusion Agreements with Respect to Annulment Warrants Greater Scrutiny of Arbitration Clauses, Kluwer Arb. Blog (Jan. 11, 2012),  https://legalblogs.wolterskluwer.com/arbitration-blog/growing-number-of-countries-allowing-exclusion-agreements-with-respect-to-annulment-warrants-greater-scrutiny-of-arbitration-clauses.
119Id.
120UNCITRAL Digest, supra note 68, at 135.
121Id.
122See infra Part II.B.
123Wolff, supra note 38, at 637 (“The driving force behind this development towards an increased finality of awards was to maintain the attractiveness of London as a venue for international arbitration.”).
124Id.
125Arbitration Act 1996, c. 23, § 69 (U.K.).
126Michael Dunmore, Chapter III: The Award and the Courts, The Seat: Its Influence on Proceedings and Enforcement, in Austrian Yearbook on International Arbitration 2015 373 (Christian Klausegger et al. eds., 2015).
127Adam Samuel, The 1979 Arbitration Act—Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards on the Merits in England, 2 J. Int’l Arb. 53, 54 (1985).
128Nigel Blackaby, Constantine Partasides & Alan Redfern, Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration ¶ 10.71 (7th ed. 2023).
129Kate Davies, In Defence of Section 69 of the English Arbitration Act, Kluwer Arb. Blog (Nov. 1, 2010), https://legalblogs.wolterskluwer.com/arbitration-blog/in-defence-of-section-69-of-the-english-arbitration-act.
130Id.
131Id.
132Samuel, supra note 127, at 74.
133Id.
134Id.
135Stephan Wilske, Todd J. Fox & Rafał Kos, What’s New in European Arbitration?, 72 Disp. Resol. J. 79, 84 (2017).
136Id.
137Id.
138Id.
139Id. at 85.
140Courtney Furner, Vasiliki Dritsa & Vera Bykova, Jurisprudence of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court in Setting Aside and Revision Proceedings Involving Investment Arbitration Awards (2020 to 2022): Strengthening Switzerland as a Pro-Arbitration Jurisdiction, in The Future of Swiss Arbitration ¶¶ 23–26 (Johannes R. W. et al. eds., 2023).
141Id.
142Republic of Croatia v. MOL Hungarian Oil & Gas Co., Tribunal fédéral [TF] Oct. 17, 2017, 4A_53/2017, ¶¶ 2.2–2.3 (Switz.).
143Id.
144Id.
145Id.
146Id.
147Wilske et al., supra note 135, at 86.
148Sharp Corp. v. Viterra B.V., [2024] UKSC 14, ¶¶ 4–38 (U.K.) (May 8, 2024).
149Id.
150Id.
151Id.
152Id.
153Claire Messer & Lucy Wickham, The GAFTA Default Clause and the Scope of Arbitration Appeals, Kluwer Arb. Blog (Aug. 13, 2024), https://legalblogs.wolterskluwer.com/arbitration-blog/the-gafta-default-clause-and-the-scope-of-arbitration-appeals.
154Id.
155Id.
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About the Contributor
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International Arbitration Lawyer

Alina Aguilar is an international arbitration lawyer with experience in both commercial and investment arbitration.  She practiced for six years at Asali, a leading arbitration and commercial litigation boutique in Mexico City, before working as a Foreign Associate at Chaffetz Lindsey LLP in New York.  In September 2026, she will join White & Case LLP as an Associate in Mexico City.  Her experience includes complex commercial arbitrations and investor-State disputes under the ICC, LCIA, AAA, and UNCITRAL Rules, as well as arbitration-related court proceedings.  Alina earned her LL.M. with honors from Columbia Law School and her law degree summa cum laude from Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM).