The rising tide of climate change is no longer a distant prospect.  Scientific consensus, including the latest findings of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), confirms that sea level rise is accelerating, with projections indicating that average global sea levels could rise by nearly a metre by 2100.1Fox-Kemper, B., H.T. Hewitt, C. Xiao, G. Aðalgeirsdóttir, S.S. Drijfhout, T.L. Edwards, N.R. Golledge, M. Hemer, R.E. Kopp, G. Krinner, A. Mix, D. Notz, S. Nowicki, I.S. Nurhati, L. Ruiz, J.-B. Sallée, A.B.A. Slangen, and Y. Yu, 2021: Ocean, Cryosphere and Sea Level Change. In Climate Change 2021: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Masson-Delmotte, V., P. Zhai, A. Pirani, S.L. Connors, C. Péan, S. Berger, N. Caud, Y. Chen, L. Goldfarb, M.I. Gomis, M. Huang, K. Leitzell, E. Lonnoy, J.B.R. Matthews, T.K. Maycock, T. Waterfield, O. Yelekçi, R. Yu, and B. Zhou (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, pp. 1211–1362, doi: 10.1017/9781009157896.011, https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg1/chapter/chapter-9/.X1  This trajectory presents an existential crisis for many Caribbean Small Island Developing States (SIDS)–also known as large ocean states–a term that redefines them by their vast maritime zones, not limited landmass2Transform Aqorau, Rethinking the Governance of Small Island Developing States as Large Ocean States: The Case of Fisheries Management in the Pacific, 27 INT’L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 659, 662 (2012).X2–where coastal settlements, vital infrastructure, and the majority of populations lie within only a few metres of the current high-water mark.  The combination of accelerating erosion, saltwater intrusion, and increased flooding risks threatens not only livelihoods but the very survival of low-lying communities.

Against this stark backdrop, sea level rise has long been recognised within the work of the International Law Commission (ILC) as a phenomenon with profound implications for multiple branches of international law.3Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Seventy-First Session, U.N. Doc. A/78/10, ch. VIII, ¶ 128 (2019) (“At its seventy-first session (2019), the International Law Commission decided to include the topic ‘Sea-level rise in relation to international law’ in its programme of work.”).X3 At least three areas of the field are directly engaged.  First, the law of the sea is implicated, as rising waters threaten to redraw baselines, submerge maritime features, and alter the entitlements and jurisdictional claims of coastal and island states.  Second, human rights law comes under pressure as sea level rise endangers fundamental rights, including the rights to life, adequate housing, food, water, health, and self-determination.  Third, the body of international law concerning statehood and the protection of persons—encompassing refugee law, migration law, and the principle of non-refoulement—faces novel challenges as communities are displaced, territories become uninhabitable, and the continuity of states themselves may be put at risk.

The ILC has grappled with these issues for over a decade, engaging in sustained debate over how existing rules might be adapted or reinterpreted in light of these environmental realities.  Questions have persisted over whether maritime boundaries should remain fixed despite physical changes, how human rights obligations apply extraterritorially in displacement scenarios, and what protections international law affords to populations whose states may lose territory or effective control.  These debates have been marked by differing state positions, doctrinal uncertainties, and a lack of authoritative judicial guidance.

The International Court of Justice’s (ICJ) Advisory Opinion on Climate Change, delivered in July 2025, marks a watershed moment in this evolving discourse.  While not binding, the opinion carries significant legal and political weight, offering, for the first time, a comprehensive articulation of states’ obligations in the face of climate change impacts, including sea level rise.  This post focuses on the ICJ’s ruling as it relates to sea level rise and climate change.  However, it must be noted that the ICJ made groundbreaking determinations on states’ legal obligations to (1) reduce greenhouse gas emissions to keep warming below 1.5 C, (2) cooperate internationally to protect the environment and prevent transboundary climate harm, and (3) uphold human rights when implementing climate policies.4Obligations of States in Respect of Climate Change (Advisory Opinion), 2025 I.C.J. 187, ¶¶ 237-249, 250-254 132-139, 140-141, 268–70, 369-404 (July 23), available at https://www.icj-cij.org/case/187/advisory-opinions.X4

This article examines the ICJ’s findings on sea-level rise and its consequential effects on maritime entitlements, the law of the sea, statehood, sovereignty, human rights, and international refugee law.  The ICJ’s advisory opinion significantly advances the legal framework by reinforcing claims to preserve maritime boundaries and statehood, affirming the applicability of the non-refoulement principle in the context of climate-induced displacement, and recognizing that climate change implicates both individual and collective human rights.

Few branches of international law are as physically grounded as the law of the sea.  Codified in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)—also referred to as the “Montego Bay Convention” because it was signed in Montego Bay, Jamaica—this legal regime defines the maritime entitlements of coastal states based on the geography of their land territory, especially the baselines from which maritime zones are measured.1United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), art. 5, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397.X1  For Caribbean SIDS such as the Bahamas and Barbados, whose populations, ports and economies are clustered on narrow coastal zones, this baseline is not merely a technical feature:  it is the anchor of sovereignty, economic survival and national identity.2Government of The Bahamas, Written Statement to the International Court of Justice on Climate Change and International Law, ¶ 2 (2023).X2

Under Article 5 of UNCLOS, the “normal baseline” from which maritime zones are measured is the low-water line along the coast as marked on officially recognised charts.3UNCLOS, supra note 5, art. 5.X3  This line determines a state’s territorial sea (12 nautical miles), contiguous zone (24 nautical miles), exclusive economic zone (EEZ) (200 nautical miles) and, in many cases, its continental shelf.  These zones are not abstract legal constructions; they confer sovereign rights over critical resources, from fisheries to seabed minerals, and allow states to regulate navigation, conserve marine biodiversity, and pursue economic development.4Id. at arts. 2-3, 33, 56, 76.X4

Yet sea-level rise directly threatens this foundation.  As coastlines recede or vanish due to climate change, the low-water line baseline risks shifting landward, potentially shrinking maritime claims or even extinguishing them entirely.  For archipelagic states like the Bahamas, whose EEZ of over 630,000 square miles dwarfs its landmass, this could be economically catastrophic.  In Barbados v. Trinidad and Tobago, the arbitral tribunal recognized the profound dependence of Caribbean SIDS on their maritime zones, stressing equity in resource access and the special vulnerability of island economies.5Barbados v. Trinidad and Tobago, Permanent Court of Arbitration, Award, 27 R.I.A.A. 147, ¶¶ 240-50 (1928).X5  Similarly, the ecosystems of the Bahamas and Barbados form the backbone of tourism and fisheries, making maritime sovereignty indispensable.6Id.; see also U.N. Dep’t of Econ. & Soc. ffs., Blue Economy for Sustainable Development: Caribbean Case Studies, Bahamas Ministry of Tourism, Economic Impact of the Tourism Sector (2022), at 7–10, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/2021/CDP/43 (2021), available at https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/wp-content/uploads/sites/45/publication/CDP-bp-2021-43.pdf. X6

Before the ICJ’s recent intervention, international law was deeply divided on how to handle this crisis.  The debate centered on whether baselines under UNCLOS should be interpreted as ambulatory-shifting with every change in the physical coastline-or fixed-stabilized at a legally defined line, preserving entitlements despite sea-level rise.  The traditional view, rooted in the principle that “the land dominates the sea”, favored ambulatory baselines.7North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany v Denmark), 1969 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 96 (Merits Feb. 20).X7  This approach, affirmed in Nicaragua v. Colombia, held that maritime rights derive from sovereignty over land territory, and if the territory changes, so too must maritime zones.8Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), 2012 I.C.J. 624, ¶ 177 (Judgment Nov. 19).X8

However, scholars and vulnerable coastal states increasingly argued that the ambulatory rule was unjust and unsustainable in the age of climate change.9David Vidas & David Freestone, The Impacts of Sea Level Rise and the Law of the Sea Convention: Facilitating Legal Certainty and Stability of Maritime Zones and Boundaries, 99 INT’L L. STUD. 36 (2023).X9  If strictly applied, it would mean that rising seas, driven largely by industrialized nations, could strip SIDS of the very maritime spaces they depend upon, despite contributing minimally to global emissions.  Recognizing this inequity, the Bahamas and Barbados explicitly rejected ambulatory baselines in their written submissions to the ICJ.10The Bahamas, Written Statement to the International Court of Justice on the Request for an Advisory Opinion on the Obligations of States in Respect of Climate Change (2023), available at https://www.icj-cij.org/node/204386; Written Statement of Barbados, Obligations of States in Respect of Climate Change, ¶¶ 133–150, 200–201 (Mar. 22, 2024), available at https://www.icj-cij.org/node/204389.X10  They argued that UNCLOS should be interpreted in light of contemporary environmental realities and the principle of equity, so that “climate change and sea-level rise must not affect the existing legal rights of States over maritime zones”.11Supra note 14.X11  Barbados similarly asserted the maritime zones once lawfully established should remain fixed, safeguarding legal certainty and economic security.12Id.X12

These positions did not emerge in isolation.  The Bangladesh v. Myanmar case before ITLOS offered supportive reasoning:  the tribunal acknowledged the vulnerability of low-lying coastal states and stressed that maritime delimitation must be guided by equitable principles.13Delimitation of the maritime boundary in the Bay of Bengal (Bangladesh/Myanmar), ITLOS Reports 2012 No. 16, p. 4, ¶¶â€¯291–94. (Judgment 14 Mar. 2012).X13  Beyond case law, there was also a growing body of state practice and diplomatic statements.  In 2015, the Polynesian Leaders Group adopted the Taputapãtea Declaration, affirming the rights of island states to fix their baselines permanently without regard to sea-level rise.14Taputapuātea Declaration on Climate Change, Polynesian Leaders Group (July 2015), available at https://www.samoagovt.ws/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/The-Polynesian-P.A.C.T.pdf. X14  The Pacific Island Forum echoed this, calling for boundaries to be formalized so they could not be challenged or reduced by climate change.15Declaration on Preserving Maritime Zones in the Face of Climate Change-Related Sea-Level Rise, Pacific Islands Forum (Aug. 6, 2021), available at https://forumsec.org/sites/default/files/2024-03/2021%20Declaration%20on%20Preserving%20Maritime%20Zones%20in%20the%20face%20of%20Climate%20Change-related%20Sea-level%20rise.pdf. X15  Scholars like Coalter Lathrop and Yoshifumi Tanaka identified three policy models-ambulatory baselines, temporarily fixed baselines, and permanently fixed baselines-arguing that only the third could reconcile the law of sea with climate justice.16Coalter G. Lathrop, Ambulatory Versus Fixed Baselines Under the Law of the Sea in the Context of Sea Level Rise, 38 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 301, 308–09 (2023). X16

In line with these regional declarations, the ITLOS Advisory Opinion on Climate Change and International Law further affirmed that legal certainty regarding baselines and maritime entitlements is vital for the protection of climate-vulnerable states.  In its 2024 opinion, the Tribunal underscored that “maintaining legal stability in the face of sea-level rise is essential to the effective protection of the rights of SIDS.”17Request for an Advisory Opinion Submitted by the Commission of Small Island States on Climate Change and International Law Case No. 31, Advisory Opinion of May 21, 2024, ¶ 156, https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/31/Advisory_Opinion/C31_Adv_Op_21.05.2024_orig.pdf.X17

The ITLOS Advisory Opinion was requested by the Commission of Small Island States on Climate Change and International Law (COSIS), an intergovernmental body founded by Antigua and Barbuda and Tuvalu and joined by states such as Palau, Niue, Saint Lucia, and Vanuatu.18Commission of Small Island States on Climate Change and International Law (COSIS), About, https://cosis.ambaland.gov.ws/about/ (last visited May 14, 2025).X18  COSIS was established to champion the use of international law in securing climate justice.19Id.X19  In response to their request, ITLOS concluded that the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea does not require states to adjust their baselines or maritime zones solely because of physical changes caused by sea-level rise.20Request for an Advisory Opinion Submitted by the Commission of Small Island States on Climate Change and International Law Case No. 31, Advisory Opinion of May 21, 2024, ¶ 361, https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/31/Advisory_Opinion/C31_Adv_Op_21.05.2024_orig.pdf.X20  This opinion marked a significant jurisprudential step, prefiguring and complementing the ICJ’s own 2025 advisory opinion.

A particularly influential scholarly proposal came from Professor Moritaka Hayashi, who advocated for an implementation agreement under UNCLOS, modelled on the 1994 Agreement on Part XI (seabed mining).  This instrument, Hayashi argued, could clarify that “a coastal State may declare its baselines as permanent … notwithstanding subsequent geographic changes due to sea level rise,” thus harmonizing stability with the spirit of UNCLOS.21Moritaka Hayashi, Sea-Level Rise and the Law of the Sea, Research Handbook on Climate Change, Oceans and Coasts 81 (Elgar 2020), https://doi.org/10.4337/9781788112239.00010.X21  While such an amendment faced political hurdles, it offered a legally coherent pathway to protect vulnerable states.

Against this backdrop of legal uncertainty and normative evolution, the 2025 ICJ advisory opinion marked a watershed moment.  In its advisory opinion on the obligations of states concerning climate change, requested by the UN General Assembly and actively supported by the Bahamas, Barbados, Antigua and Barbuda, and other SIDS,22Protection of civilians and upholding legal and humanitarian obligations, G.A. Res. ES-10/21, U.N. Doc. A/RES/ES-10/21 (June 26, 2023), https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/2045177.X22 the Court directly addressed the implications of sea-level rise for maritime entitlements.  The Court concluded:

scientific data demonstrate that sea level rise is likely to have adverse consequences for States, particularly small island States and low-lying coastal States, potentially leading to forced displacement of populations … as well as affecting the territorial integrity of States and their permanent sovereignty over their natural resources.  In the Court’s view, since these principles are closely connected with the right to self-determination, sea level rise is not without consequences for the exercise of this right.23Supra note 4, ¶ 357.X23

Most significantly, the ICJ held that once a state has established maritime zones under UNCLOS, sea-level rise does not automatically extinguish these entitlements stating:

The Court considers that the provisions of UNCLOS do not require States parties, in the context of physical changes resulting from climate-change related sea level rise, to update their charts or lists of geographical co-ordinates that show the baselines and outer limit lines of their maritime zones once they have been duly established in conformity with the Convention.  For this reason, States parties to UNCLOS are under no obligation to update such charts or lists of geographical co-ordinates.24Id. ¶ 362.X24

This judicial affirmation transforms what had been state practice, scholarly argument, and soft law declarations into authoritative guidance under international law.  The Court framed fixed baselines not as a special exemption, but as a logical and equitable adaptation to ensure that those least responsible for climate change do not suffer disproportionate harm.  The advisory opinion’s reasoning draws explicitly on the principles of equity, sovereign continuity, and the right to self-determination, recognizing that the survival of SIDS as sovereign actors should not hinge on geographic permanence alone.

Importantly, the ICJ’s dicta also validated the arguments advanced by the Bahamas and Barbados: that climate change must not undermine the legal certainty of maritime entitlements that are central to economic survival and cultural identity.  In doing so, the Court harmonized UNCLOS’s text with evolving international norms and environmental realities, reflecting a dynamic interpretation that keeps the law of the sea fit for purpose in the Anthropocene.

The ICJ’s opinion thus reframes fixed baselines not as an opportunistic claim but as an equitable adaptation necessary to safeguard the sovereignty and economic viability of SIDS.  It crystallizes the emerging opinio juris evident in regional declarations, state practice, and ITLOS jurisprudence.  By affirming that climate change must not strip SIDS of maritime zones, the Court provides a doctrinal foundation for climate justice in the law of the sea.

Ultimately, the advisory opinion invites the international community to move beyond defensive preservation and toward proactive reform.  Caribbean states, in alliance with Pacific nations, have already demonstrated leadership in forging diplomatic consensus and legal innovation.  The challenge ahead lies in institutionalizing this guidance—ensuring that fixed baselines are formally recognized and protected under international law, and that the economic and cultural lifelines they secure remain intact for generations to come.

The relationship between territory and sovereignty has long been central to the concept of statehood in international law.  The classical definition of a state, drawn from the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, identifies four essential elements (i) a permanent population (ii) a defined territory (iii) government and (iv) the capacity to enter into relations with other states.1Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, art. 1, 165 L.N.T.S. 19 (Dec. 26, 1993). X1  Of these, the existence of a defined territory has traditionally been viewed as indispensable.  As articulated in the seminal arbitral award in the Island of Palmas case (1928), “sovereignty in the relations between States signifies independence.  Independence in regard to a portion of the globe is the right to exercise therein, to the exclusion of any other State, the functions of a state”.2Island of Palmas (Neth. v. U.S.), 2 R.I.A.A. 838, at 838-39 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928).X2

However, SIDS–particularly low-lying coral atoll nations and small archipelagic states–are testing this understanding of statehood.  As climate change drives rising sea levels, the physical territory of these states is quite literally disappearing.  A 1.5 degree Centigrade global temperature rise could submerge entire atoll nations such as Tuvalu and Kiribati within the century, and significant portions of coastal lands in the Bahamas, the Marshall Islands, and parts of the Caribbean would be rendered uninhabitable or lost altogether.  This looming loss of habitable territory raises existential legal questions:  Can a state exist without territory? Does the erosion of landmass invalidate sovereignty or extinguish legal personality under international law?

Prior to 2025, international law provided only limited and inconclusive guidance on these issues.  The law recognized sovereignty as continuous and resilient, but had not yet addressed the scenario of territorial disappearance caused by environmental change.  Scholars such as Rosemary Rayfuse and Jenny Grote had advanced the concept of the “deterritorialised state”, arguing that international law must evolve to preserve the rights and personality of states even without inhabitable land, especially when the loss of territory is involuntary and externally caused.3Rosemary G. Rayfuse, International Law and Disappearing States: Utilising Maritime Entitlements to Overcome the Statehood Dilemma, UNSW Law Research Paper No. 2010-52 (Nov. 7, 2010), available at SSRN, https://ssrn.com/abstract=1704835; Jenny Grote Stoutenburg, When Do States Disappear? Thresholds of Effective Statehood and the Continued Recognition of “Deterritorialized” Island States, in Threatened Island Nations: Legal Implications of Rising Seas and a Changing Climate 57, 88 (Michael B. Gerrard & Gregory E. Wannier eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2013), available at https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139198776.008.X3  Pacific and Caribbean leaders echoed these arguments diplomatically:  the Majuro Declaration (2013), Ambo Declaration (2009), and submissions to the ILC all stressed the need for legal continuity for states facing territorial loss from sea-level rise. 

The 2025 Advisory Opinion of the ICJ marked a historic clarification of these legal uncertainties where the Court rejected the notion that the loss of territory automatically undermines statehood.  It further observed:

[I]n the event of the complete loss of a State’s territory and the displacement of its population, a strong presumption in favour of continued statehood should apply.  In the view of the Court, once a State is established, the disappearance of one of its constituent elements would not necessarily entail the loss of its statehood.4 Supra note 4, ¶ 363.X4

This finding confirms that statehood is not rigidly tied to territory in a physical sense, but rather that sovereignty can persist when population, government, and international legal personality remain intact.  Furthermore, the Court underscored the obligation of states to cooperate to protect the rights of climate-vulnerable populations: “States must work together with a view to achieving equitable solutions, taking into account the rights of affected States and those of their populations.”5Id. ¶ 365.X5

This affirmation marks a significant doctrinal shift.  It validates the argument- long advanced by SIDS and legal scholars- that international law must evolve to preserve sovereignty in face of climate-induced territorial loss.  This Court’s pronouncement supports the idea that international recognition and continued participation in international institutions, rather than physical territory alone, are sufficient to uphold legal personality.  In doing so, it offers a path forward for states like Tuvalu or the Marshall Islands that have begun exploring “digital statehood” or land purchase agreements abroad as strategies for survival.6Dawn Wright, Threatened by Sea Level Rise, Tuvalu Safeguards Its Sense of Place with a Digital Twin, ESRI BLOG (Oct. 29, 2024), https://www.esri.com/about/newsroom/blog/tuvalu-digital-twin-resilience; Jake Bittle, Inside the Marshall Islands’ Life-or-Death Plan to Survive Climate Change, GRIST (Dec. 5, 2023), https://grist.org/extreme-weather/marshall-islands-national-adaptation-plan-sea-level-rise-cop28/. X6

Moreover, the Court’s reasoning aligns with the principle of equity and the “no harm” rule in customary international law, which places a duty on states to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction do not cause transboundary harm.7See Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1941) (establishing the principle that a state must not use its territory in a manner causing significant harm to another state); Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Urug.), 2010 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶¶ 101–110 (Apr. 20) (affirming the obligation of states to prevent significant transboundary environmental damage through cooperation and notification); Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. Rep. 7, ¶¶ 53–79 (Sept. 25) (reaffirming the duty of states to prevent, reduce, and control pollution affecting other states).X7  SIDS losing their legal status due to sea-level rise largely driven by emissions from industrialized states would represent a profound violation of those principles. 

In this context, the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion becomes a jurisprudential cornerstone.  It affirms that statehood, sovereignty, and legal rights must be protected despite environmental changes, and that vulnerable nations are entitled to continuity of legal recognition and rights under international law.  In practical terms, this could mean:

• Maintaining diplomatic recognition even without inhabited territory;
• Continuing participation in the United Nations and treaty bodies; and,
• Retaining maritime entitlements and sovereign rights over natural resources in accordance with UNCLOS (as discussed in the prior section).

The ruling complements and builds upon the ITLOS Advisory Opinion delivered in 2024, which similarly found that UNCLOS does not require states to revise their baselines or maritime claims due to sea-level rise, emphasizing the need for legal certainty to protect the rights of SIDS.8Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities with Respect to Activities in the Area, Case No. 17, Advisory Opinion of Feb. 1, 2011, ITLOS Rep.¶ 112.X8  Together, the two opinions form a twin jurisprudential confirmation of climate justice principles within the law of the sea and general international law.

In sum, the ICJ’s ruling is not only legally significant but normatively powerful.  It places climate change at the heart of international legal responsibility, and affirms that the law cannot remain indifferent to the physical and existential erasure of entire nations.  Instead, it demands solidarity, cooperation, and adaptation—tools that can safeguard sovereignty not merely as a geographical fact, but as a legal and moral right.

The ICJ’s recent pronouncements make clear that climate change “impairs the enjoyment of a range of rights protected by human rights law”1Supra note 4, ¶ 375.X1 including the rights to life, health, and an adequate standard of living, as well as the rights of women and the right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment.2Id. ¶¶ 376, 377, 378, 380, 393.X2  These impacts are not speculative but present realities that will intensify as sea levels rise.3Id. ¶ 376.X3  The Court expressly connected these consequences to the principle of non-refoulement, stressing that where the adverse effects of climate change would expose individuals to a real risk of a violation of certain human rights, states “must not remove such persons” to territories where those risks would materialise.4Id. ¶ 378.X4  Also of import, in examining the right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment, the Court “conclud[ed] that, under international law, the human right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment is essential for the enjoyment of other human rights”.5Id. ¶ 393.X5  Taken together, the ICJ’s pronouncements embed climate harms within the existing protective framework of international human rights law, confirming that obligations under instruments such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), and regional human rights treaties extend to climate-related threats.

The ICJ’s conclusions converge with UNHCR’s 2020 and 2023 guidance, which affirm that while people displaced by climate-related impacts may not fall under the strict definition of “refugee” in the 1951 Convention, they may nonetheless be entitled to protection under complementary pathways where serious human rights risks are present.6U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Legal Considerations Regarding Claims for International Protection Made in the Context of the Adverse Effects of Climate Change and Disasters, (Oct. 1, 2020), https://www.refworld.org/docid/5f75f2734.html; UNHCR, Climate Change and International Protection: UNHCR’s Mandate, § 1.2 (Dec. 2023), available at https://www.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/2023-12/UNHCR%20note%20on%20climate%20change%20international%20protection%20UNHCRs%20mandate%20Dec%202023.pdf. X6  The Court’s articulation strengthens the interpretative basis for such protection, especially when read alongside the Human Rights Committee’s 2020 decision in Teitiota v. New Zealand.  In that case, while the Committee did not find a violation, it acknowledged that “without robust national and international efforts, the effects of climate change in receiving States may expose individuals to a violation of their rights under articles 6 or 7 of the Covenant, thereby triggering the non-refoulement obligations of sending States”.7Human Rights Committee, Teitiota v. New Zealand, Comm. No. 2728/2016, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/127/D/2728/2016, ¶ 9.11 (Nov. 23, 2020). X7  The ICJ’s ruling builds upon this, moving the discussion beyond individual communications toward a general statement of law that applies across the spectrum of human rights obligations.

This clarification is particularly relevant for Caribbean SIDS, where the mounting threat of sea-level rise poses a complex challenge for the protection of rights tied to territory, identity, and survival.  Existing international law has traditionally anchored statehood and rights protection in fixed territory.  Nonetheless, as the ICJ’s opinion underscores, the climate crisis exposes the limits of these paradigms.  For low-lying Caribbean states, displacement—whether internal or cross-border—is no longer a hypothetical risk but an imminent reality.  The legal question is shifting from whether climate change will cause displacement to how the international legal framework must adapt to protect those affected.

The Biden Administration’s 2021 Report on the Impact of Climate Change on Migration acknowledges climate change as an accelerating driver of human mobility.8White House, Report on the Impact of Climate Change on Migration (Oct. 2021), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/Report-on-the-Impact-of-Climate-Change-on-Migration.pdf.X8  While it stops short of creating a new category of “climate refugee,” it calls for integrating climate considerations into refugee protection systems, humanitarian aid strategies, and bilateral agreements.9Id.X9  This aligns with the ICJ’s approach, which embeds climate risks within existing human rights protections rather than creating parallel regimes.  By affirming that obligations such as non-refoulement apply in the climate context, the Court provides states and policymakers with a stronger legal basis to adapt existing mechanisms to emerging threats.

Similarly, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has consistently supported the use of humanitarian visas, temporary protection measures, and regional mobility schemes as interim solutions for those displaced by environmental harm.10UNHCR, Projected Global Resettlement Needs 2026, at 14–16 (2025), available at https://www.unhcr.org/us/sites/en-us/files/2025-06/projected-global-resettlement-needs-2026_44.pdf; UNHCR, Displacement Across Borders: Good Practices and Legal Challenges (June 2024), available at https://www.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/2024-06/displacement-across-borders-good-practices-law-review-research-series.pdf.X10 [10]  The ICJ’s opinion strengthens the normative weight of such measures, framing them not merely as policy options but as responses rooted in binding human rights obligations.  This shift reinforces the principle that the right to life, security, and dignity must be safeguarded against foreseeable climate harms.

Rising seas threaten not only homes but also the cultural and spiritual heritage embedded in the traditional lands and livelihoods of Caribbean peoples.  Displacement from low-lying communities can therefore constitute a systemic assault on collective rights recognized in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and other human rights instruments.12International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976); International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969); Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981); United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007); American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (entered into force July 18, 1978); Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“Protocol of San Salvador”), Nov. 17, 1988, O.A.S.T.S. No. 69 (entered into force Nov. 16, 1999).X12  The International Court of Justice in East Timor has affirmed that the right of peoples to self-determination is an erga omnes obligation—universal in character and, in its words, “irreproachable”.13East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90, ¶ 29 (June 30).X13

For the Caribbean, this recognition carries implications that extend beyond individual rights to encompass collective rights under international law, including self-determination, cultural preservation, and the maintenance of territorial integrity.  By threatening the territorial and political survival of islands, climate change can therefore be framed as both a collective human rights violation and a breach of obligations owed to the international community as a whole.  Most recently, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACTHR), in its Advisory Opinion OC-26-25 (2005), found that climate change constitutes a violation of collective rights, including the rights to traditional lands and livelihoods, underscoring the collective and intergenerational dimensions of these harms.14The Obligations in Matters Of Human Rights of a State that has Denounced the American Convention on Human Rights and the Charter of the Organization of American States, Advisory Opinion OC-26/25, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) No. 26 ¶¶ 75–80, 112–115 (July 3, 2025) (finding climate change violates collective rights to traditional lands and livelihoods, and underscoring the intergenerational nature of the harm).X14

The ICJ’s climate ruling, aligned with human rights law, offers Caribbean states new tools for legal and diplomatic advocacy.  It supports pushing for regional protocols that integrate environmental harm into human mobility frameworks, grounded in equity and common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR).  While soft law builds norms, lasting protection requires a binding treaty on climate-induced displacement, assigning greater responsibility to major emitters.15Ruvimbo Samanga, Climate-Induced Displacement: Establishing Legal Protections for Climate Refugees, HUM. RTS. RESEARCH (Feb. 28, 2022), https://www.humanrightsresearch.org/post/climate-induced-displacement-establishing-legal-protections-for-climate-refugees.X15  The ICJ’s recognition of climate change as a human rights issue strengthens these demands, especially for vulnerable SIDS.

By closing the gap between climate realities and international law, the ICJ affirms obligations—including non-refoulement—where climate risks threaten communities.  This provides a solid legal basis for climate justice, enabling Caribbean advocates to link environmental protection with individual and collective human rights under international law.

The ICJ Advisory Opinion of July 2025 marks a profound advancement for SIDS, particularly those in the Caribbean, in their ongoing pursuit of climate justice.  By affirming that international law requires states to take measures to prevent, mitigate, and redress the harms caused by climate change, the Court has transformed long-standing aspirations into binding legal obligations.  For SIDS, the Opinion preserves crucial entitlements:  it affirms the permanence of maritime zones notwithstanding physical changes to coastlines, thereby safeguarding sovereignty, fisheries, and economic resources that are essential for survival.  It also confirms that statehood is not extinguished by the loss of habitable territory, fortifying the political and legal continuity of nations most at risk from rising seas.  In doing so, the Court has not only clarified contested points of law but also provided a legal shield for the foundational rights and interests of vulnerable states.

The Opinion’s contribution to the protection of human rights, while groundbreaking, also opens a new chapter that calls for further development and implementation.  The Court acknowledged the profound and adverse effects of climate change on a wide range of rights, from the rights to life, health, food, and water, to the cultural and self-determination rights of affected peoples.  It recognised that the principle of non-refoulement extends to situations where return would expose individuals to serious climate-induced harm.  These findings significantly strengthen the legal foundation for climate-related human rights protection.  The next step for Caribbean states is to translate this jurisprudence into concrete measures—developing domestic legal frameworks that integrate the Court’s interpretation of human rights obligations into migration, disaster response, and development planning.  It also means leveraging the Opinion to press for more robust monitoring and enforcement mechanisms within the UN human rights treaty bodies and the Inter-American system.

For Caribbean Community states, the path forward involves both domestic and international action.  Domestically, they can enact legislation codifying the ICJ’s findings, aligning climate policies with human rights standards, and ensuring that maritime and resource rights remain protected irrespective of territorial changes.  Internationally, they can spearhead initiatives in the UN General Assembly, the Human Rights Council, and regional fora to secure compliance with the Advisory Opinion and to embed its principles into treaty regimes.  Strategic litigation, coalition-building with other climate-vulnerable states, and targeted diplomatic engagement with major emitters can further enhance pressure for compliance.  The Advisory Opinion is not the culmination of the struggle but a decisive tool—one that, if effectively utilised, can transform the moral and political claims of SIDS into enforceable norms, reshaping the global legal landscape in favour of climate justice.